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INTRODUCTION
A dominant theme in the legal and political literature is
that the legislative function and its attendant rent-seeking
threaten property rights and promote their coercive redistribu1
tion. Yet, as some scholars have recognized, in certain circum2
stances politics may promote private property protection. I
view this debate through the lens of judicial takings, a doctrine
espoused in a plurality opinion in the 2010 Supreme Court
1. See, e.g., Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New
York Court of Appeals, 1850–1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 355 (1990) (describing
how courts distrusted political solutions to regulating land use competition);
Cass R. Sunstein, On Property and Constitutionalism, 14 CARDOZO L. REV.
907, 916 (1993) (discussing harms to democracy from resource entitlement destabilization by the political process). This argument is central to the voluminous literature examining the impact of rent-seeking special interests groups,
as well as to Richard Epstein’s work on takings. See generally RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
199–209 (1985) (voicing concerns about rent-seeking factions gaining the
property of others); Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation
Principle, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1561, 1586–90 (1986) (reviewing EPSTEIN, supra)
(describing the centrality of the rent-seeking concern to Epstein’s theory of
takings). For literature on the dynamics of legislative rent-seeking, see
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 132–67 (1971) (discussing
theoretical underpinnings of special interest groups); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–31 (1985) (describing the
power of “discrete and insular minorities” to capture the legislative process).
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 339–40 (1995); Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and
Just Compensation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 137–38 (1992); cf. JAMES W.
ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT 155 (1992) (arguing that
property rights should not be left entirely to political process).
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case, Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Depart3
ment of Environmental Protection. The discourse on judicial
takings has focused on the constitutionality and comparative
institutional competence of federal courts versus state courts to
4
address judicial property activism. This Article brings a neglected player to the fore—state legislatures. I advance a state
legislative process theory, grounded by takings federalism, that
calls into question the need for judicial takings and reveals underappreciated benefits of the status quo. State legislative
checks of court activism suggest one explanation for why judicial takings protection has not developed in either the federal
or state systems—and an argument against adopting a federal
judicial takings doctrine now.
In Stop the Beach, the Supreme Court addressed whether a
Florida Supreme Court decision to uphold Florida’s Beach
Shore Preservation Act effected an unconstitutional taking of
5
private property rights. After sanding a seventy-five-foot wide
strip to create new shorefront, the state replaced the mean high
water line with a “fixed erosion control line,” which meant that
that the state owned the restored portion of the beach and any
6
future accretions (i.e., gradual additions of sand to the beach).
The U.S. Supreme Court held that there had been no taking
because under Martin v. Busch, an obscure Florida precedent
7
brought to light in the U.S. Solicitor General’s amicus brief,
3. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010).
4. See id. at 2619 (Breyer, J., concurring) (voicing concern about federal
judges playing “a major role in the shaping of a matter of significant state interest—state property law”). For academic scholarship on this point, see D.
Benjamin Barros, The Complexities of Judicial Takings, 45 U. RICH. L. REV.
903, 932–36 (2011) (analyzing tensions of federal court review of state court
decisions); Stacey L. Dogan & Ernest A. Young, Judicial Takings and Collateral Attack on State Property Decisions, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 107,
116–18 (2011) (discussing judicial federalism concerns); Amnon Lehavi, Judicial Review of Judicial Lawmaking, 96 MINN. L. REV. 520, 561 (2012) (examining principles that limit federal review of state court decisions); Timothy M.
Mulvaney, The New Judicial Takings Construct, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 247,
251–59 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/946.pdf (discussing the
relationship between judicial takings and due process).
5. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2600–01 (citing Walton Cnty. v. Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1116–21 (Fla. 2008)).
6. Id. at 2599 (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 161.161(3)–(5), 161.191(1)–(2) (2010)).
The state assumed ongoing obligations to maintain the restored beach and did
not claim any rights of public use. Id.
7. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 26, Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (No. 08-1151), 2009 WL 3183079 at *26
(citing Martin v. Busch, 112 So. 274, 284–85 (Fla. 1927)).
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man-made avulsions that expose previously submerged land
8
seaward of the littoral property belong to the state.
The constitutional innovation in Stop the Beach came when
a plurality of four of the eight sitting Justices announced that
the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause should apply to the judiciary—a doctrine without precedent beyond passing reference
9
in a few cases and discussion in two law review articles. Rejecting due process protection as insufficient, the plurality
maintained that if “a court declares that what was once an established right of private property no longer exists, it has taken
10
that property.” State court decisions that “merely clarify and
11
elaborate property entitlements” are not judicial takings. Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality, offered a textualist justification: the Takings Clause “is not addressed to the action of a
specific branch or branches . . . the particular state actor is ir12
relevant.” The plurality further concluded that state courts
cannot redress state supreme court takings and that these cases must be heard by the ostensibly less compromised federal
13
courts.
Judicial takings doctrine, at least in the expansive form
14
proposed by the plurality, is a costly innovation. Scholars
have described the potential harms from judicial takings, prin8. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2596. “Avulsion” refers to the sudden
loss or addition of land by the force or action of water. See id. at 2598. But see
Richard A. Epstein, Littoral Rights Under the Takings Doctrine: The Clash Between Ius Naturale and Stop the Beach Renourishment, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL’Y 37, 65 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court misinterpreted
Martin v. Busch).
9. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2602. For early scholarly discussions
of judicial takings, see Williamson B.C. Chang, Unraveling Robinson v.
Ariyoshi: Can Courts “Take” Property?, 2 U. HAW. L. REV. 57, 78 (1979); Barton H. Thompson Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1472–1512
(1990).
10. Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2602. In the plurality opinion, Scalia rejected the notion of “using Substantive Due Process to do the work of the Takings Clause,” arguing that to do so would require reliance on a “more generalized notion of Substantive Due Process” despite “an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection.” See id. at 2606 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994)).
11. Id. at 2609.
12. Id. at 2601–02.
13. See id. at 2609.
14. Of course, costliness depends on the breadth and construction of judicial takings doctrine. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Picturing Takings, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 57, 90 (2012) (noting that applying certain limiting principles
would make judicial takings “something rarely encountered in the wild”).
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cipally the chilling of common law development and infringe15
ment on state autonomy. A spate of scholarship also details
how judicial takings will waste judicial resources, hamstring
environmental protection and responses to climate change, create perverse litigation incentives, and threaten the internal
16
consistency of federal takings jurisprudence. Even a narrowly
crafted judicial takings doctrine has the potential to increase
litigation and court costs and, in some cases, frustrate public
17
efforts to protect property. In view of these costs, it is worth
examining existing institutional mechanisms more closely in
considering whether to adopt judicial takings, and if so, how
broadly to define this doctrine.
The narrative that accompanies judicial takings is that
state courts are prone, or at least vulnerable, to overreaching
and “taking” private property rights and when this occurs there
18
is no effective check. State legislative protection is a counternarrative that has been ignored in the judicial takings debate,
which has focused on the propensity of state courts to overreach
and the capacity of federal courts to address these abuses. In
the unusual instances when radical state court decisions eliminate clearly established property rights, state legislatures often
respond with legislation that restores most or all of the original
19
private property entitlement. State legislative checks not only
revise state court judgments ex post, they also influence courts
15. See Dogan & Young, supra note 4, at 115–16 (discussing costs to common law development and federalism); Mulvaney, supra note 4, at 266 (“[T]he
new judicial takings construct may very well threaten the ability of the law to
adapt and evolve in the face of changing economic, environmental, social, and
technological developments.”).
16. See, e.g., Donna R. Christie, Of Beaches, Boundaries and SOBs, 25 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 19, 71–72 (2009) (discussing the consequences of judicial takings doctrine on legal responses to climate change); Michael B. Kent,
Jr., More Questions than Answers: Situating Judicial Takings Within Existing
Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 143, 156–66 (2011) (examining the unresolved questions about the relationship between judicial takings
and regulatory takings as prescribed by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544
U.S. 528 (2005)); Eduardo M. Peñalver & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Judicial
Takings or Due Process?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 335–54 (2011) (describing
the perverse incentive created by a judicial takings for underinvesting in litigation to clarify common law property rights).
17. But see Frederic Bloom & Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U.
CHI. L. REV. 553, 557 (2012) (contending that in some circumstances judicial
takings can provide beneficial transition relief for property law changes).
18. See, e.g., Thompson Jr., supra note 9, at 1495–98.
19. For case studies of legislative checks in Hawaii, Minnesota, Utah, and
California, see infra Part II.
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ex ante toward property stability. Legislative revisions offer
other advantages: state legislatures can adopt middle ground
solutions, pay off losers, frame revisions to build consensus and
increase political palatability, and, through their role as state
constitutional backstops, perhaps even fortify legislators’ con20
stitutional commitments.
A recent example of a state legislative check of judicial
property activism is the case Conatser v. Johnson, in which the
Utah Supreme Court abruptly eliminated riparian owners’ riv21
erbed property rights. Breaking with longstanding precedent
and state understanding of public water rights, the Utah Supreme Court held that the public had the right to stand on riverbeds, opening up a massive fishing industry within feet of
22
private homes and retreats. The legislature responded swiftly
with the Public Waters Access Act that restored the property
rights to the private riverbed owners, the original entitlement
23
holders. The legislature also offered a degree of implicit compensation to the losing recreational users by granting rights of
portage and adverse possession and by prohibiting the practice
24
of stringing wire across rivers to block recreational users.
In a legislative process model, state court restraint works
in a balanced tandem with legislative revision. Legislative
checks are too resource intensive and variable to serve as a
first-line response. State courts have evolved doctrinal substitutes for judicial takings, such as state common law doctrines
of vested rights, that orient courts toward property rights sta25
bility and conservatism. Political pressures on elected state
court judges also mitigate judicial activism. We need not char20. Cf. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS 57–58 (1999) (arguing that the federal courts’ robust constitutional
role reduces attention to constitutional concerns by Congress).
21. See 194 P.3d 897, 902 (Utah 2008).
22. See id. (“[E]very private landowner to whom the [public water ownership] easement applies [is] subject to the reasonable burdens imposed by the
easement. These burdens include the public’s right to both travel over private
property when floating and to touch the water’s bed while floating.”).
23. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-201(3), -202(3) (West 2012).
24. Id.§ 73-29-202(2) (granting the right to “portage around a dangerous
obstruction”); id. § 73-29-203(1)(a) (“Public recreational access is established if:
the private property has been used by the public for recreational access requiring the use of the public water for a period of at least 10 consecutive years
. . . .”); id. § 73-29-207 (allowing a land owner to place a fence across public water, but requiring the fence to be in compliance with other state and local
laws).
25. See infra Part I.A.
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acterize state court judges as rent-seeking political actors or
anti-majoritarian angels to recognize that they operate within
political networks characterized by a non-trivial degree of pressure from campaign financing (primarily by business and con26
servative interests) and electoral scrutiny. If these political
influences affect state court decisions, they cut more often than
not in the direction of private property protection, at least with
27
respect to in-state owners and rights.
No system, whether state legislative checks or a newly
minted judicial takings doctrine, is fail-safe (e.g., judicial takings require costly appeals that some would-be claimants cannot afford to pursue). Majoritarian support or strong interest
group support for a “judicial taking” can block legislative
checks. State legislatures may have little motivation to check
state supreme court decisions that validate favored enactments. When legislative revision does occur, it is not invariably
efficient or fair. Certainly, there are examples of dysfunctional
legislation in the histories of state and local land use regula28
tion. Accordingly, the robust role of state courts as a first-line
defense is important, as is the vigorous politics that attend the
high-stakes natural resource and land use contexts of most al29
leged judicial takings.
26. This is a political iteration of social networks theory. See Mark
Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 1 SOC. THEORY 201, 203–07 (1983).
27. In some instances, lower court judges may have political motives to
favor local interests in their property rights adjudications; however, the panel
or en banc structure of state supreme court review addresses this sort of local
bias. For an example of a controversial state court treatment of out-of-state
property interests, see In re SRBA, No. 24546, 1999 WL 778325 (Idaho Oct. 1,
1999), superseded on reh’g, Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1270
(Idaho 2000) (Justice Silak’s controversial opinion); John D. Echeverria,
Changing the Rules by Changing the Players: The Environmental Issue in
State Judicial Elections, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 217, 238–54 (2001).
28. See, e.g., San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621,
625 (1981) (describing how a municipal legislature rezoned the landowner’s
property to open-space intending to acquire the property and retained the zoning without compensation after the voters failed to approve funding for the
park).
29. See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST.
COMMENT. 279, 289 (1992) (noting that victims of takings have the organizational advantages of forming a small group with high stakes, sharing a geographic connection, and appealing to political parties or groups); Stewart E.
Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 114
YALE L.J. 203, 235 (2004) (distinguishing takings questions from “free speech
or equal protection controversies that typically pit a disenfranchised individual with an unpopular cause against the power of the state”).
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My account of state legislative process protection for judicial takings hews to takings federalism and the rationales underlying the Supreme Court’s longstanding delegation of much
30
of regulatory takings doctrine to state courts. Stewart Sterk
describes how the Supreme Court has implicitly delegated power to the states by adopting a balancing test that establishes a
high threshold for unconstitutional regulatory takings, relies
on state law to define the “reasonable investment-backed expectations” component of that test, and almost invariably up31
holds state court determinations. As Sterk explains, this is
not a matter of muddled takings jurisprudence but of federal32
ism. Regulatory takings claims involve state- or local-level
law and conflicts that federal courts lack the expertise, re33
sources, and desire to resolve. As a result, the Supreme Court
has de facto devolved primary responsibility for regulatory tak34
ings doctrine to the states. In the context of judicial takings,
takings federalism undermines the case for expanding the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause to encompass courts. Making the
offending state supreme court a primary author of the judicial
takings doctrine and substantive property law that will pur30. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 206–07, 254.
31. See id. at 251 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617
(2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32. See id. at 270–71.
33. See id. at 233 (“A statute or regulation enacted in one jurisdiction
might pass constitutional muster even though an identical statute in another
jurisdiction has proven constitutionally infirm—all because of a difference in
background state law.”).
34. See Melvyn R. Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause
and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV. 464, 498 (2000) (arguing that
“the Court should give state and local governments a fairly wide berth when
determining whether a landowner should be compensated for the developmental effect of land use regulations”); Marc R. Poirier, Federalism and Localism
in Kelo and San Remo, in PRIVATE PROPERTY, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
AND EMINENT DOMAIN 101, 117 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2008) (noting that the
Supreme Court “in effect defer[s] to state court policing of state and local government implementation of the eminent domain power, whether via the federal public use clause or for other reasons and doctrines”); Carol M. Rose, What
Federalism Tells Us About Takings Jurisprudence, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1681,
1684 (2007) (“[T]hough the federal courts are now much more active in takings
cases than they once were, their decisions continue to leave the vast bulk of
property and land use supervision to the state courts.” (citing Sterk, supra
note 29, at 238–44)); Sterk, supra note 29, at 206 (“The Supreme Court’s . . .
balancing test, which, as a matter of practice, results in deference to the state
courts, recognizes the institutional advantages state courts enjoy in constraining regulatory abuse.” (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 129 (1978))).
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portedly constrain it leaves the alleged judicial fox guarding the
henhouse. Conversely, rigorous federal scrutiny and a robust
judicial takings doctrine developed by federal courts not only
chill state common law development but cast the Supreme
Court back into the state law waters it has so studiously sought
to exit.
The central thesis of this Article is that in view of takings
federalism and the costs of judicial takings, the existing balance of state legislative checks and state court restraint works
well enough to police against state court activism with respect
to property rights. The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the mechanisms of restraint that orient state court
judges toward property rights stability. The limited number of
state legislative checks of judicial “takings” are due in substantial measure to doctrines and norms of judicial restraint that
make radical judicial confiscation, and the need for legislative
revision, an unusual occurrence. Part II, the heart of the Article, advances a legislative process theory of judicial takings
grounded in case studies of state legislative checks. I explore
the comparative institutional advantages of situating judicial
revision primarily in state legislatures. Part III considers the
potential unintended consequences of the judicial takings doctrine elaborated in Stop the Beach for state legislative process.
Part IV discusses the implications of my analysis, with particular attention to takings federalism, and addresses possible objections to my account. Throughout the Article, I assume that
judicial takings doctrine is likely to follow the contours of regulatory takings doctrine, at least loosely, by requiring a substantial degree of property rights interference and by affording less
protection to use rights. I leave as open questions the degree of
judicial takings protection afforded to owners (i.e., the threshold for success) and whether temporary takings damages will
35
apply under First English.
I. BASELINES OF RESTRAINT: DOCTRINAL AND
POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Because of the high costs of legislative lawmaking, a legislative process approach to judicial takings requires that the
state courts not tax legislatures too heavily with activism. As
Isaac Ehrlich and Richard Posner have observed, legislation is
35. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
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“an extremely expensive form of [law] production.” This Part
considers how doctrinal, institutional, and political forces constrain courts and limit property rights radicalism. The Stop the
Beach plurality’s expansive judicial takings doctrine, which
would apply to any judicial interpretation that eliminates a
common law property right and possibly encompass private
party cases, implies that state court overreaching is a problem
37
of magnitude and breadth. Some of the scholarly response,
even that opposed to judicial takings doctrine, has accepted to a
significant degree the narrative of state court property rights
abuses—a major critique is not that state court judges are more
constrained than assumed, but that federal court judges may
38
be similarly activist. Yet, neither the Supreme Court nor
commentators advocating judicial takings have offered more
than a handful of examples of state court property “takings,”
much less systemic evidence of property rights overreaching, by
39
state courts.

36. See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 267 (1974).
37. See Mulvaney, supra note 4, at 260–01 (noting inconsistent language
in the Save the Beach plurality opinion that “raises the question of whether
the plurality’s standard applies where a state court, in adjudicating an exclusively private dispute, clarifies a property rule in a manner that effectively results in a private-to-private reassignment”).
38. See William P. Marshall, Keynote Address, Judicial Takings, Judicial
Speech, and Doctrinal Acceptance of the Model of the Judge as Political Actor,
6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 26 (2011) (“The premise that judicial decisions inevitably reflect political bias does not allow for exception and does
not exclude Justices sitting on the United States Supreme Court.”); Peñalver
& Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 328–29 (describing risks for judicial wrongdoing). But see Lehavi, supra note 4, at 579–80 (arguing that judicial interpretations of broad legislative standards or legal issues left unaddressed in state
statutes are an exercise of legislatively delegated authority, not a judicial taking).
39. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Stop the Beach Renourishment and the Problem
of Judicial Takings, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 92–100 (2011) (arguing that the “principle [of judicial takings] follows logically from both the
text and the original meaning of the Fifth Amendment”). Discrete examples of
state court property activism include County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d
57, 57–58 (Haw. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 132 (1974) (holding that landowners were not entitled to compensation for land below the seaward boundary line of an ocean front lot condemned by the state for public use) (reversed
on appeal to federal district court), and McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Robinson,
504 P.2d 1330, 1345 (Haw. 1973), adhered to on reh’g, 517 P.2d 26 (Haw. 1973)
(holding that “owners of land, having either or both riparian or appurtenant
water rights, have the right to the use of the water, but no property in the water itself”).
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What is the basis of the apparent belief of much of the Supreme Court and many legal commentators that state courts
have a proclivity toward abusing or unsettling private property
rights? In recent opinions, the Supreme Court has subscribed
to a political view of state court judges. In Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, the Court invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, a Minnesota judicial canon forbidding candidates for judicial office from announcing their views on disput40
ed legal or political issues. The Court framed state court
judges as political actors bound only by the requirement that
they not act on personal bias against a particular litigant. In
the absence of such bias, it is permissible, and indeed expected,
that when a judge takes a stand during an election about an issue, subsequently “the party taking the opposite stand [in a
case before that judge] is likely to lose. . . . not because of any
bias against that party . . . [but because] [t]he judge is applying
41
the law (as he sees it) evenhandedly.” Once the Court
acknowledged the political nature of judging, it was a short
step to envisioning its threat to private property rights. In Stop
42
the Beach, a plurality of the Court took that step. They presented state courts as a comparably dangerous branch to legislatures with respect to property rights and announced that
both bodies require the disciplining hand of the Takings
43
Clause.
A. DOCTRINAL AND INSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON STATE COURT
PROPERTY ACTIVISM
Perceptions and intuitions about judicial property rights
abuses derive disproportionately from canonical cases that followed the atypical path to Supreme Court review or are featured in law school curriculums and scholarly articles for their
44
controversial positions or dramatic redistributions. Hawaii,
40. 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
41. Id. at 776–77.
42. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130
S.Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010).
43. Their opinion subsumed both courts and legislatures in the political
category of state actors, declaring that “[i]t would be absurd to allow a State to
do by judicial decree what the Takings Clause forbids it to do by legislative
fiat.” Id. at 2601.
44. For example, famous takings cases heighten perceptions of the frequency of shoreline management plans depriving owners of all of their development rights, state courts redistributing property from employers to employee-tenants, localities abusing eminent domain for economic redevelopment to
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with its unique and bitter history of land appropriation, conflict
over native rights, and a century of attempted secession, also
contorts the landscape of property law with cases such as Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, County of Hawaii v.
Sotomura, and McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Robinson, that redistribute private property to the state or even to other private
45
parties. It is no surprise that Hawaii cases feature dispropor46
tionately in accounts depicting the problem of judicial takings.
But is this “property canon” the everyday stuff of state
47
courts? Cases where state courts apply precedent to uphold
established common law property rights or overturn lower
court property rights abuses are less thrilling to the imagination as well as less accessible (such cases lack written opinions
48
more often than those overturning established rights). Selecserve private interests, and courts transferring valuable water use rights from
private parties to the public. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1008 (1992); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 232–36 (1984);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35–36 (1954).
45. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245 (upholding as constitutional the transfer
of land via eminent domain from plantation owner oligopoly to private citizens); County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 62–63 (Haw. 1973) (holding
no compensation owned for eminent domain for land seaward of the upper
reaches of the wash of the waves because the court rejected the longstanding
prior common law seaward boundary); McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Robinson,
504 P.2d 1330, 1344 (Haw. 1973) (breaking with common law to hold that the
normal surplus water was the property of the state and that riparian owners
could not transfer that water outside the watershed). For accounts of the historical forces underlying Hawaiian property conflicts and the history of the
Hawaiian sovereignty movement, see MICHAEL KIONI DUDLEY & KEONI
KEALOHA AGARD, A CALL FOR HAWAIIAN SOVEREIGNTY 107–29 (1993), and
JON M. VAN DYKE, WHO OWNS THE CROWN LANDS OF HAWAI’I? 1–10 (2008).
46. See, e.g., Robert H. Thomas et al., Of Woodchucks and Prune Yards: A
View of Judicial Takings from the Trenches, 35 VT. L. REV. 437, 442–50 (2010)
(describing a number of takings cases from Hawaii); see also Barros, supra
note 4, at 941 (citing two Hawaii cases as “good examples” of takings jurisprudence).
47. We need not believe these cases are strictly representative for ongoing
exposure and engagement with them to affect our perceptions. See Lee Epstein
& Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11–14, 52–53 (2002)
(critiquing the empirical and logical shortcomings of legal scholarship); see also Ahmed E. Taha, Data and Selection Bias: A Case Study, 75 UMKC L. REV.
171, 174–77 (2006) (exploring how selection bias affects conclusions).
48. See Jane Williams, Survey of State Court Opinion Writing and Publication Practices, 83 LAW LIBR. J. 21, 22 (1991) (noting that several jurisdictions only publish opinions that “establish a new rule of law; that alter, modify, explain, or criticize an existing rule; that involve an issue of continuing
public interest; that resolve conflicts; or that apply an existing rule to a new
fact situation”).

2188

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:2176

tion bias, in the form of constitutional and scholarly focus on a
small collection of exceptional cases, means that
nonrepresentative cases have disproportionate influence in le49
gal thought and policy.
The focus on exceptional cases belies the high baseline of
state judicial restraint and property rights stability. Certainly,
courts alter common law doctrines in light of changed circumstances and create exceptions to avoid forfeiture or other per50
ceived unfairness. Yet, the target of the Stop the Beach plurality—the wholesale elimination of established common law
51
property rights—appears to be an unusual occurrence. Even
among the small group of cases commonly understood as activist, most are less radical, or produce more ephemeral changes,
than commonly assumed. For example, water and shoreline
common law is interwoven with precedents recognizing public
and private interests, often in a checkered or waxing and wan52
ing lineage. Sometimes what appears to be a sudden change
in the law or a property redistribution actually reflects the judiciary strengthening or reviving longstanding threads of pub53
lic common law water rights. When state court holdings are
truly radical, they are often narrowed over time as subsequent
54
cases carve out exceptions and limit the precedent. For exam49. Scientists and methodologists have long recognized the issue of selection bias and inferential error. See ROBERT M. GROVES, SURVEY ERROR AND
SURVEY COSTS 28–30 (1989).
50. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV.
577, 597–601 (1988).
51. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2616 (2010).
52. See, e.g., Kenneth K. Kilbert, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Great
Lakes Shores, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 4–10 (2010).
53. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Prior Appropriation: Rule, Principle, or
Rhetoric?, 76 N.D. L. REV. 881, 882–83, 892–95 (2000) (contending that the
common law of prior appropriation in water rights is mostly rhetoric and that
it truly functions as an extreme default rule that induces cooperation and bargaining).
54. For example, in State v. Shack, the New Jersey Supreme Court departed from the traditional common law property right of owners to exclude by
holding that trespass as defined in the New Jersey statute does not include
the right to bar access to governmental services to migrant workers housed on
private property. 277 A.2d 369, 374 (N.J. 1971). The New Jersey courts cabined this holding in subsequent cases. State v. Schmid adopted a multi-part
test that restricted trespass depending on the nexus between the nature of the
property and expressional activity. 423 A.2d 615, 621–22 (N.J. 1980). Then
Committee for a Better Twin Rivers v. Twin Rivers Homeowners’ Ass’n held
that common interest communities were private property not subject to consti-
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ple, the activist nature of State v. Shack and its sharp departure from precedent are renowned, but not the decision’s ero55
sion in a line of subsequent New Jersey cases.
In other cases, radical holdings seem less radical with a
closer view of the circumstances. For example, Marc Poirier’s
56
historical study of Matthews v. Bayhead and similar New Jersey beach access cases reveals that rather than a bald transfer
of property rights, these cases were responses by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and the
state government to de facto discrimination barring minorities
57
from beaches. In the famous case of State ex rel. Thornton v.
Hay, the Oregon Supreme Court denied a legislative takings
challenge by introducing a common law doctrine of custom that
58
secured public use rights in beach areas. Justice Scalia harshly criticized this case in his objection to the Court’s denial of
certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, a subsequent
59
case upholding Thornton. Scalia opined that a state court
cannot evade takings liability by declaring custom to be a back60
ground principle of state law. An underappreciated fact of the
Thornton case, however, is that the public had already acquired
those use rights through the more commonplace doctrine of
prescription (a variant of adverse possession applicable to
61
easements). Basing the decision on prescription would have
tutional limitations on state actors with respect to expressional activities and
assembly. 929 A.2d 1060, 1072–74 (N.J. 2007).
55. See supra note 54.
56. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984).
57. Marc R. Poirier, Environmental Justice and the Beach Access Movements of the 1970s in Connecticut and New Jersey: Stories of Property and Civil Rights, 28 CONN. L. REV. 719, 732–42, 772–75, 808–11 (1996). Although the
litigants in many of the beach access cases focused their claims on statutory
and public trust arguments rather than equal protection, racial discrimination
remained in the backdrop of the cases. See id. at 762–65, 772–75. Another fact
worth noting is that although the precedents in New Jersey are quite remarkable, lack of parking and public access points and creative beach fees technically within the letter of Neptune reduce the impact of these holdings. Public
Trust Doctrine and Public Access in New Jersey, URBAN HARBORS INST., UNIV.
OF MASS. BOS. 8–9 (Jan. 2003), http://www.uhi.umb.edu/pdf_files/public_
access_in_nj.pdf.
58. 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969) (holding that the state’s refusal to allow a
beachfront owner to install fencing was not a taking).
59. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207 passim (1994) (Scalia,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
60. See id. at 1214.
61. 462 P.2d at 676 (holding that the public could have acquired the disputed land based on prescription rights).
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led to years of fact-intensive parcel-by-parcel litigation whereas
custom accomplished the same legal purpose, more bluntly
62
perhaps, but with far less judicial and litigation expense.
Doctrinal and institutional, as well as political, forces orient state courts toward property rights stability so that legisla63
tive checks are rarely necessary. As an ex ante matter, the
“age of statutes” and codification limit the influence of the
common law and judicial lawmaking—indeed, some scholars
64
have argued that it strains the judicial function altogether.
Doctrinally, a number of common law doctrines function as judicial takings substitutes by preventing and invalidating judicial property redistributions (though not by providing compen65
sation). Canons of common law judging such as stare decisis,
the principle that absent important countervailing considerations like cases should be decided alike, promote property
66
rights stability. State due process, wrongly painted with the
62. See Michael C. Blumm & Elizabeth B. Dawson, The Florida Beach
Case and the Road to Judicial Takings, 35 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
REV. 713, 743 (2011).
63. Property theorists advocate stability of entitlement with a variety of
rationales, including encouraging investment, facilitating transfer by minimizing information costs, strengthening relationships to property and community,
and protecting democracy. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 40–41 (8th ed. 2011) (discussing the need for stable property rights to
encourage investment); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal
Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110
YALE L.J. 1, 63–64 (2000) (offering an information-minimization theory of
property forms); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV.
1889, 1894 (2005) (offering a relational theory of property); Sunstein, supra
note 1, at 916 (arguing that property rights that are vulnerable to destabilization by the political process weaken democracy).
64. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1,
5–6 (1982). Responding to “statutorification,” Guido Calabresi has argued that
common law courts should judge whether a legal rule is anachronistic or inapposite to the legal framework, and either renovate the rule or induce legislative reconsideration. Id. at 163–66.
65. In a 1992 article, Daniel A. Farber argued that judicial decisions
should rarely be considered takings because “formalized procedures” make the
risk of discrimination against a particular party or non-state actors comparatively low. See Farber, supra note 29, at 307.
66. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 194 (2012) (“The doctrine of stare decisis is designed to promote stability in the law, but is a principle of policy, rather than
a rule requiring mechanical adherence.”); 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 129 (2012).
From Edward Coke to the present, the core conception of common law judging
is of reliance on precedent rather than unpredictable changes or sua sponte
reinterpretation. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law
Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 55, 588 (2006) (advancing a theory of common
law originalism at the time of the founding that balanced continuity with flex-
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same brush as federal due process as inefficacious—a constitutional wimp—by the Stop the Beach plurality and some scholars, has been a major impetus in the development of common
67
law property doctrines safeguarding private entitlements.
Vested rights doctrines, emanating from state due process, protect private property rights once an owner establishes that her
expectations were reasonable and backed by financial invest68
ment.
These doctrines include “grandfathering” non69
conforming uses despite later zoning changes and protecting
owners who make substantial good-faith investments from subsequent change in land use regulations that would prevent de70
velopment. Waiver protects a claimant’s reasonable and sufficiently crystallized expectations based on prior nonenforcement of covenants and rules by homeowners associaibility by treating common law as “supplying the terms of a debate” about constitutional questions). Some state courts and practice guides counsel a strong
form of stare decisis and require “urgent reasons for departures” while others
frame it as a “principle of policy” and clarify exceptions for precedents that are
“unworkable or badly reasoned.” Compare Marsillett v. State, 495 N.E.2d 699,
704 (Ind. 1986) (“[A] rule which has been deliberately declared should not be
disturbed by the same court absent urgent reasons and a clear manifestation
of error.”), with 1 MICHIGAN PLEADING & PRACTICE § 2:81 (2d ed. 2012) (“Stare
decisis is a principle of policy rather than an inexorable command.”).
67. See, e.g., Friarsgate, Inc. v. Town of Irmo, 349 S.E.2d 891, 894 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a developer had a vested property right that prevented the town from applying a new zoning ordinance to his condominium
construction project); Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d
559, 564–65 (Utah 1967) (striking a zoning ordinance as an unconstitutional
taking as applied to plaintiff’s parcel, which had vested rights).
68. See Richard B. Cunningham & David H. Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land Development Process, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 625, 641 (1978).
The common law protections for vested rights apply unless owners act in bad
faith, expand the use beyond their original vested right, abandon the property,
or signal both attenuated expectations and limited harm (e.g., through lack of
financial investment or steps toward construction). See Grayson P. Hanes & J.
Randall Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and Development, 46 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 373, 407–08 (1989) (describing variation and exceptions in vested rights doctrines).
69. See Town of Surry v. Starkey, 332 A.2d 172, 175 (N.H. 1975); Gibbons
& Reed Co., 431 P.2d at 563 (“[A] zoning ordinance which required the discontinuance forthwith of a nonconforming use would be a deprivation of property
without due process of law.”).
70. See, e.g., Henry & Murphy, Inc. v. Town of Allenstown, 424 A.2d 1132,
1133–34 (N.H. 1980) (“[T]he common-law rule is that ‘an owner, who, relying
in good faith on the absence of any regulation which would prohibit his proposed project, has made substantial construction on the property or has incurred substantial liabilities relating directly thereto, or both, acquires a vested right to complete his project . . . .’” (quoting Gosselin v. Nashua, 321 A.2d
593, 596 (N.H. 1974))).
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71

tions. Similarly, laches prohibits the enforcement of an equitable servitude when the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed
and in doing so altered the expectations of the defendant to her
72
prejudice.
There is also little support for the claim that state courts
will wrongfully favor or “collude” with legislatures in order to
uphold state enactments—and if this does occur it can be re73
dressed as a standard Fifth Amendment legislative taking.
Judicial favoritism toward legislatures or legislative enactments is not a straightforward matter: many enactments pass
through divided legislatures and in some cases the political
winds may have shifted and legislators no longer back the enactment. The legislature may be sympathetic to a takings claim
against an agency-promulgated regulation they had not envisioned and do not favor. Also, many cases of court activism, or
seeming court activism, focus on pure common law issues (often
water rights) or interpret the common law in a way that either
74
upholds or does not address a state legislative enactment. In
Stop the Beach, a case involving a state enactment and potential takings compensation, the Florida trial and appellate
courts divided and the litigants failed to present a key prece75
dent on avulsion. Poor legal research, not favoritism toward
the legislature, informed the Florida Supreme Court’s deci76
sion.
To be clear, my claim is not that state courts never err or
overreach or that they resist incremental adjustments of prop71. See, e.g., Woodlands Civic Ass’n v. Darrow, 765 So. 2d 874, 876–77
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a restrictive covenant forbidding businesses in residential subdivision did not apply to owner’s chiropractic business
when the immediate prior owner had run a business there for many years and
made commercial changes to the exterior of the building without homeowner
association enforcement).
72. See POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY: MICHAEL ALLAN WOLF DESK EDITION § 60.10[1] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2009). In addition, the emergence of
“investment-backed expectations” as a major prong of regulatory takings analysis accords constitutional force to stability of expectations. See Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
73. I thank Stewart Sterk for this insight. For an account of the problem
of courts colluding with legislatures to uphold legislative enactments, see
Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 328–29.
74. See supra notes 52–55.
75. For an overview of the procedural history, see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 130 S. Ct.
2592, 2600–01 (2010).
76. See id.
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erty rights. Carol Rose describes how courts “muddy” crystalline property rules over time with exceptions and rule variants
that address changed circumstances, protect a guileless or
77
bumbling party, protect property, or avoid forfeiture. Some
property law doctrines, such as adverse possession, allow
changes to property rights, although state courts typically apply the legal standards stringently so prevailing on these
78
claims is difficult. Other cases, such as nuisance, address conflicting or unallocated property rights in a zero-sum manner;
79
incursions on property interests are inevitable. On the whole,
however, state courts exercise a high baseline of restraint with
respect to property rights through doctrines and norms that
serve the prophylactic purpose now envisioned for judicial takings.
B. POLITICAL DISINCENTIVES FOR JUDICIAL PROPERTY
ACTIVISM
In the judicial takings debate, the divided scholarly literature depicts state court judges as anti-majoritarian bulwarks
aligned with the rule of law or as political actors requiring re77. See Rose, supra note 50, at 597–601.
78. For example, contrary to the doctrinal wisdom that most courts consider state of mind irrelevant to adverse possession, R.H. Helmholz’s classic
study found that courts generally rule against adverse possessors when there
is evidence that their encroachments are intentional. See R.H. Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 339–41 (1983).
In a similar vein, the doctrine of changed circumstances enables courts to
modify covenants in light of changed circumstances. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.10 (2012). However, state courts typically
require not mere changed circumstances but rather the impossibility of accomplishing the servitude’s purpose or something extremely close to it before a
court will modify or terminate a servitude. See, e.g., Rick v. West, 228
N.Y.S.2d 195, 195 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962) (denying a change of covenant to permit sale to a non-residential buyer even though portions of the neighborhood
were unusable for residential purposes).
79. For example, nuisance law generally confronts the private right to
commit a nuisance versus the private property right to be free of the nuisance.
See, e.g., Ark. Release Guidance Found. v. Needler, 477 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Ark.
1972); Oliver v. AT&T Wireless Servs., 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491, 500 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999). Incursion on someone’s private rights is inevitable and courts generally
apply cost-benefit analysis to determine rights allocations. See Henry E.
Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
965, 967 (2004). Similarly, some of the common limitations in joint tenancies
and concurrent estates that may seem at first blush to be appropriating or redistributing property rights are in fact trying to protect and balance property
interests among multiple owners. See, e.g., Yale B. Griffith, Community Property in Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STAN. L. REV. 87, 95 (1961).
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80

straint through judicial takings. Critics of judicial takings
maintain that the doctrine disparages the anti-majoritarian
81
role of the judge and subverts the autonomy of state courts.
Opposing commentators, and the Stop the Beach plurality, fear
that political influence over state court judges will translate into redistribution of private property rights and weaken the le82
gitimacy of the courts. This Article departs from this binary
debate. I contend that state court judges are politically responsive bodies and that this fact undermines the claimed need for
judicial takings. Judicial politics, particularly in an age of
property rights interest groups, more often than not cuts in favor of property rights stability and against radical divestment
of private property rights. My argument is not that political responsiveness, standing alone, justifies federal Takings Clause
immunity for state courts; if that were the case we would need
to exempt legislatures from takings liability as politically responsive institutions. As I will explore in detail in Part IV, takings federalism and common law development are also at the
heart of the case for eschewing judicial takings. My point here
is that the political responsiveness of state courts is a factor
that limits the strain on state legislative checks (which are too
variable and resource intensive to serve as a first-line defense)
and maintains stable systems of property rights.
80. In some respects, this divide maps onto the scholarly debate between
legal formalism (i.e., rule of law judging) and a branch of legal realism that
advocates that law is indeterminate and instead judges should consider political and economic factors. See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE
BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 52–53
(Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2003).
81. See Daniel L. Siegel, Why We Will Probably Never See a Judicial Takings Doctrine, 35 VT. L. REV. 459, 461–67 (2010) (arguing that judicial takings
doctrine undermines state sovereignty and impedes the evolution of the common law); see also Christie, supra note 16, at 23; cf. Echeverria, supra note 27,
at 300 (“[I]n the last few years, pro-business groups have mounted major campaigns to influence state environmental policies by altering the composition of
the state courts.”). William P. Marshall has gone further to express concern
that the Supreme Court’s framing of judges as political actors will become a
self-fulfilling prophecy that will weaken the legitimacy not only of state courts
but ultimately of federal courts and the Supreme Court as well. Marshall, supra note 38, at 25–28.
82. See Somin, supra note 39, at 100 (noting that one way that the “‘majoritarian’ argument against the judicial takings doctrine errs [is] in assuming
. . . that courts are insulated from majoritarian pressures”); John C. Yoo, In
Defense of the Court’s Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 781–82 (2001); cf.
Marshall, supra note 38, at 33–34 (arguing that judicial takings will increase
political behavior by judges by eroding norms against such behavior and lessening its stigma).
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Across the nation, the political and cultural demand for
private property protection is robust and growing, as evidenced
83
by both interest group politics and empirical research. Powerful property rights interest groups have proliferated and the
“wise use” conservative property movement has gained power
in the western states. Conservative and business interest
groups, who typically support strong private property protection, provide almost half of all judicial campaign money and are
84
highly influential in judicial recalls. The precise degree to
which politics influences judges is unknowable—even if selfreport on this topic was forthcoming, it would not be credible.
However, it seems implausible that politics and the strong
(though not unlimited) public support for private property
rights protection have no influence over state court judges.
85
Empirical research supports this intuition. Even if political
pressures merely reinforce existing legal and doctrinal property
rights protections by increasing their salience in judges’ minds,
this reduces the propensity for judicial “takings” that commen86
tators and the Court intimate follow from political influence.
Alexander
Bickel’s
classic
formulation
of
the
“countermajoritarian problem” of judicial review is nowhere
87
more doubtful than at the state court level. State courts re83. See, e.g., JUSTIN LEWIS, CONSTRUCTING PUBLIC OPINION 96 (2001);
Janice Nadler et al., Government Takings of Private Property, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 286, 288–90 (Nathaniel Persily et al.
eds., 2008); NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., AUGUST 22–29, 2008 NATIONAL CONSTITUTION CENTER POLL, Q15 (2008), http://surveys.ap.org/data/SRBI/AP
-National%20Constitution%20Center%20Poll.pdf. Admittedly, survey data has
limitations based on the questions asked, the framing of questions, the hypothetical nature of the questions, etc. However, survey data is one source of information and like other indicators, such as the growing number of property
protection interests groups, the empirical data reveals healthy, though not
unqualified, public sentiments favoring property protection.
84. See DEBORAH GOLDBERG & SAMANTHA SANCHEZ, THE NEW POLITICS
OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2002: HOW THE THREAT TO FAIR AND IMPARTIAL
COURTS SPREAD TO MORE STATES IN 2002, at 9 (Bert Brandenburg ed., 2002),
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/3e06222f06bc229762_yom6bgubs.pdf.
85. For a summary of the research on the effect of election on judging, see
generally CHRIS W. BONNEAU, A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE CONCERNING JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (Federalist Soc’y ed., 2012), available at http://www
.fed-soc.org/doclib/20120719_Bonneau2012wp.pdf.
86. In addition, judges imbibe the sanctity of private property by cultural
and moral beliefs and may be more likely to endorse private property protection and stability of property rights because they are typically upper-income
property owners themselves.
87. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–17 (2d ed. 1986).

2196

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:2176

spond to majoritarian interests in many respects, including
through standards of common usage and the “ordinary person”
as well as implicitly by privileging efficiency (which often corresponds to the interests of large numbers of citizens). Most powerfully, the pervasiveness of elections, and of election recalls,
casts doubt on the countermajoritarian character of state
88
courts. Curiously, the academic commentary on judicial takings has not examined the prevalence of state court elections
89
and the implications for the judicial takings debate. At the
trial court level, 64% of the states elect their trial court judges,
mostly in nonpartisan elections, and 14% of the states employ
90
periodic retention elections.
For intermediate appellate
courts, 80% of states hold initial elections or uncontested reten91
tion elections. For state supreme court justices, 42% of states
hold initial elections, and 34% have uncontested retention elec92
tions after initial appointment. And, of course, many state supreme court justices were previously lower court judges who
have already passed through the electoral filter. Notably, election is a costly process with state supreme court candidates, for
example, spending a total of $45.6 million during the 2000 judi93
cial elections.
Two major areas of electoral influence over judicial property rights decision-making are the initial “filtering” process of
election and the threat of judicial recall once elected. First, in a
climate where making the case that one will not be activist on
the bench is a near requirement for election, successful candi94
dates are likely to skew toward property conservatism. It also
seems likely that individuals willing to run for election self88. See infra note 90.
89. Much of the scholarly discussion about judicial takings appears to underappreciate the prevalence of judicial elections in state courts. See, e.g.,
Christie, supra note 16, at 23–27; Marshall, supra note 38, at 25–28; Peñalver
& Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 331. But see Somin, supra note 39, at 96–101
(arguing that judicial politics play a role in takings).
90. See Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, AM. BAR
ASS’N (last visited Apr. 17, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authcheckdam.pdf.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. Id. Average per judge spending in partisan supreme court elections in
2000 was $380,000. Id.
94. This process occurs with appointment too, because it influences who is
proposed and the outcomes of confirmation processes as well, but the inquiry
may be more prolonged in the election setting and, of course, revisited in retention elections.
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select based on a higher degree of political savvy and sensitivity (appointment systems for judges presumably involve politicking too but in a more limited form). The majority of campaign financing comes from business and conservative interest
groups (the Republican Party and the National Organization
for Marriage have been major contributors in many states in
95
recent years). Candidates that appear activist or likely to
eradicate established private property rights are unlikely to re96
ceive support from these interests. In addition to filtering,
election is also an acculturation process where popular, interest
group, and legislative disapproval of activism is impressed upon the candidate.
A second point of political vulnerability for state court
judges is from recall in retention elections. Historically, retention elections (often uncontested elections with a yes/no retention vote) exerted negligible political pressure and resulted in
97
retention by wide margins for virtually all judges. Rejecting
political process as an adequate protective against judicial takings, William Fischel wrote in 1995 that he would take seriously the political accountability of judges only “when someone
tells me of a judge being unelected because of unpopular deci98
sions less prominent than the death penalty.” In recent years,
this has come to pass with recalls in multiple states, including
recalls resulting from property rights cases. An Idaho justice
lost a retention election because voters were angered over her
opinion that congressional designation of three Idaho wilderness areas included federal reserved water rights senior to pri99
vate agricultural and commercial water rights. In response to
a 2009 decision invalidating Iowa’s ban on same-sex marriage,
95. See ADAM SKAGGS ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE ET AL., THE
NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2009–10: HOW SPECIAL INTEREST “SUPER SPENDERS” THREATENED IMPARTIAL JUSTICE AND EMBOLDENED UNPRECEDENTED LEGISLATIVE ATTACKS ON AMERICA’S COURTS 3 (Oct. 2011), http://
brennan.3cdn.net/23b60118bc49d599bd_35m6yyon3.pdf.
96. See id. at 9 (describing power of business and special interests in judicial elections).
97. See Todd E. Pettys, Judicial Retention Elections, the Rule of Law, and
the Rhetorical Weaknesses of Consequentialism, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 69, 69–70
(2012).
98. See FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 332.
99. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., State Water Politics Versus an Independent Judiciary: The Colorado and Idaho Experiences, 5 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 122,
122–24 (2001); see also In re SRBA, No. 24546, 1999 WL 778325 (Idaho Oct. 1,
1999), superseded on reh’g, Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1270
(Idaho 2000) (Justice Silak’s controversial opinion).
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voters ousted three Iowa Supreme Court judges. Alaska Supreme Court Justice Dana Fabe was nearly removed after her
votes in abortion cases by recall efforts funded by a group called
101
Alaska Family Action. The Tea Party led the charge to remove two justices from the Florida Supreme Court for not allowing citizens to vote on a proposed constitutional amendment
to bar the state from requiring individuals to purchase health
102
insurance. Threats and agitation to recall judges have become an accepted aspect of the public debate over controversial
103
state court property decisions.
In the Stop the Beach plurality opinion and the ensuing
debate about judicial takings, there has been a curious neglect
of the fact that if judges are influenced by electoral pressure
and public opinion, this more often favors protecting existing
private property entitlements. Of course, there are instances
where a powerful interest group or citizen majority, with interests affected by the judicial resolution, might influence a state
court to eliminate or redistribute private property rights. In
most cases, however, property rights activism is risky for an
elected state court judge in light of the intense public opposition to judicial property redistribution and the strong influence
of conservative interests in judicial elections and recalls. The
politics of judicial elections also cuts against concerns that
judges will favor upholding state legislative enactments at the
104
expense of private property rights. A judge’s professional political allegiance, if she has any, is likely to be to a major campaign contributor or powerful special interest rather than the
105
legislature. There are majoritarian safeguards as well. Not
100. See Roy A. Schotland, Iowa’s 2010 Judicial Election: Appropriate Accountability or Rampant Passion?, 46 CT. REV. 118, 118 (2010).
101. See Tracy Kalytiak, Mailer Targets Justice: Nonprofit Targets State
Supreme Court Judge, MAT-SU VALLEY FRONTIERSMAN, Oct. 29, 2010, at A2.
102. See William Gibson, Tea Partiers Campaign Against Justices, SUN
SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2010, http://weblogs.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/
dcblog/2010/09/tea_partiers_campaign_against.html.
103. In a recent Colorado case, for example, there was some agitation for
judicial recall after a Boulder couple lost part of their land when the judge applied clear, well-established statutory and common law on adverse possession.
See Heath Urie, Boulder’s Infamous ‘Land-Grab’ Case Settled, BOULDER DAILY
CAMERA,
http://www.dailycamera.com/ongoing-coverage/adverse-possesion
-case/ci_13106856 (last updated Aug. 14, 2009).
104. See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 328–29 (noting the potential for coordination between the judiciary and legislature in Takings
Clause cases).
105. See SKAGGS ET AL., supra note 95, at 3–7.
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only is the public generally suspicious of state appropriations of
private property rights, there is some evidence that people are
deeply angered when appropriations occur through seeming
manipulation or arbitrage between state actors, in this case
106
state courts and legislatures.
II. A POLITICAL PROCESS THEORY OF JUDICIAL
TAKINGS: STATE LEGISLATIVE CHECKS OF STATE
COURT ACTIVISM
When state courts overreach in property rights cases, state
legislatures often check them through legislative revision. To
date, there has been little attention to the institutional capacity
and competence of state legislatures to check state courts. The
Supreme Court plurality in Stop the Beach assumed that federal courts are the best-situated actors to address state court
107
property rights abuses. The mounting scholarship on judicial
108
takings has focused on state versus federal judicial review.
The inattention to state legislatures may stem from the broader
neglect of legislative checks of courts, federal or state, in our
conception of the rights-protective function of separation of
109
powers and checks and balances. This Article fills that void
by advancing a theory of legislative process protection against
judicial takings and examining the benefits, and gaps, of state
legislative checks of courts.
In the legal scholarship, several scholars have argued that
the protections and correctives afforded by political process
counsel a more limited role for Takings Clause protection
against legislative acts. John Hart Ely theorizes that judicial
106. Janice Nadler and Shari Seidman Diamond’s research provides evidence that manipulation and arbitrage by government actors heightens public
outrage and produces very strong perceptions of unfairness and wrongdoing.
See Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker
Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 713, 745 (2008).
107. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601–02 (2010).
108. See, e.g., supra note 4.
109. There is a large body of scholarship exploring how judicial review,
which enables courts to trump the decisions of popularly elected and politically
accountable legislatures, provides an important check on political action. See,
e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66
HARV. L. REV. 193, 197–99 (1952); cf. Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the
Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 856 (2008) (positing that continued
empirical study of judicial behavior has limited benefits).
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review of legislative acts should occur to correct failures of
democratic process—that is, when legislators act undemocratically to exclude or dilute minority interests or establish dual
regulatory regimes with less advantageous regulation of minor110
ity interests. William Fischel’s theory of regulatory takings
predicates a circumscribed role for takings doctrine on robust
coalition politics at the national and state level (more questionably, he argues that takings should focus on policing against
local government incentives to behave unfairly to minority in111
terests). Taking a somewhat different tack, Daniel Farber observes that a no compensation rule for takings is more likely to
reduce rent seeking and pork-barrel projects than compensation, which buys off the group “most likely to bring costs force112
fully to the attention of legislators.” The reason for compensation in his view is that lobbying by the dispossessed (who are
discrete, insular, and strongly interested minorities with more
power than diffuse majorities) will block not only inefficient
113
government projects but also efficient and desirable ones.
Marc Poirier takes issue with the sweeping nature of these accounts and argues for context-specific approaches to public
114
choice and legislative takings.
To date, there has been no serious examination of the implications of state political process for judicial takings. This Article considers legislative checks from multiple states, focusing

110. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (1980); John
Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World
Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 834 n.4
(1991).
111. FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 7, 139 (“Local insiders can use regulation in
a way that subverts the Constitution’s clear command not to take property
without compensation. The larger republics are less subject to that temptation
because the burden of regulation is more likely to fall on properly represented
insiders and their progeny.”). The conclusion about local government is the
most tenuous aspect of his theory, and its assumptions have been soundly criticized by localist Carol M. Rose. See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism,
Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1133–37, 1140 (1996) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra
note 2).
112. See Farber, supra note 29, at 292–93; cf. Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and Just Politics, 22 CONN. L. REV. 285, 308–11 (1990) (noting that takings compensation protects powerless individuals and groups).
113. See Farber, supra note 29, at 295–98.
114. See Marc R. Poirier, Takings and Natural Hazards Policy: Public
Choice on the Beachfront, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 243, 246–47, 260–61 (1993)
(questioning takings compensation for prohibitions on building in beach areas).
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115

on the cases of Conatser v. Johnson, Gion v. City of Santa
116
117
Cruz, and Robinson v. Ariyoshi. These case studies illustrate how state legislatures have revised activist state court
property decisions, including controversial cases of water and
shoreline rights and public recreational access. In some cases,
these checks functionally reversed the court decision; in other
instances legislatures have partially checked or tempered dra118
matic judicial changes to the common law. Concededly, there
are a limited number of examples of state legislative checks.
This is not because state legislatures are insufficiently concerned with property rights, but in large part because state
court doctrines, norms, and politics make radical judicial appropriations of property rights an unusual occurrence. Legislative checks are high-cost endeavors in the currencies of effort,
time, and political capital, and cannot function effectively as a
first-line defense against property activism. Accordingly, legislative checks have co-evolved with state judicial restraint into a
functional system of property protection.
In most cases, legislative checks restore the bulk of the
private property right and sometimes “pay off the losers” in a
conflict with in-kind or other benefits. As I will describe in the
following Sections, state legislative checks have additional advantages, including offering swifter redress and democratic
process, signaling legislative property norms, strengthening
legislatures’ constitutional commitments, and creating disincentives for future judicial activism. Importantly, state legislative checks also offer a better fit to takings federalism than federal court review of state judicial takings, a point I take up in
119
Part IV.

115. 194 P.3d 897 (Utah 2008).
116. 465 P.2d 50 (Cal. 1970).
117. 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
118. For example, in a case against a common interest community—the
type of private party case which may be included in the broad auspices of the
Stop the Beach plurality’s judicial takings doctrine—the California Supreme
Court replaced the longstanding rule of judicial review of common interest
community association decisions with a rule of extreme deference, seemingly
to avoid straining judicial resources. The legislature acquiesced to the change
in law but created exceptions for an interest dear to the hearts of Californians—owners with pets. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d
1275, 1278 (Cal. 1994), rev’d in part by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1360.5 (West
2012).
119. See infra Part IV.A.
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Political forces, as well as concerns for state policy and
constitutional rights, affect legislative checks of judicial proper120
ty abuses. As I will discuss in Section III.C, legislatures may
fail to check judicial overreaching that has majoritarian or
strong interest group support. Legislatures are also unlikely to
revise state court judgments that validate favored state statutes or avoid state payment of compensation. However, the fact
that vigorous interest groups on different sides of an issue are
common in property conflicts reduces the frequency of legislative inaction and dysfunctional responses substantially. Ex
ante high baselines of state court restraint also attenuate the
impact of variable legislative responses.
A. STATE LEGISLATIVE REVISION: THE CASE STUDY OF
CONATSER V. JOHNSON
The case study of Conatser v. Johnson offers a closer view
of the legislative check and the interactions between state
courts and legislatures over property rights. In Conatser, the
Utah Supreme Court expanded a common law easement for
public recreation on non-navigable waters to include not only
the long-established right to float but also the right to directly
and non-incidentally touch private water beds when wading,
boating, fishing, swimming, or engaging in other forms of water
121
recreation. By statute, all the waters in the state are the
property of the public, but in non-navigable waters, the majori122
ty in Utah, the waterbeds are mostly privately owned. A prior
precedent, J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah, had established a common law
120. For example, in a recent conflict over recreational access in Utah’s
streams and rivers following a judicial decision expanding public rights, private owners, farmers, anglers and wildlife, recreation, and environmental
groups lobbied the legislature aggressively in response to the court decision
and subsequent legislative bills. See Editorial, Closed to Fishing, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Feb. 13, 2009, http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=11701247&
itype=NGPSID (describing opposition to public recreational use of streambeds
by homeowners and farmers who own property along the rivers); Brett
Prettyman, Finally, Water Lovers in the Same Boat, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 19,
2009, http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=11743015&itype=NGPSID (describing anglers, duck hunters, and kayakers descending on the Utah State
Capitol armed with waders, paddles, nets, and duck calls to protest the initial
bill proposed in response to the state supreme court decision broadening access).
121. 194 P.3d 897, 902–03 (Utah 2008). The court saw this shift from prior
common law as “necessary for the effective enjoyment of all the rights provided for in the easement.” Id. at 902.
122. See id. at 900.
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easement in the public to “utilize” non-navigable waters for rec123
reation. However, the Court in J.J.N.P. Co. indicated via citation to another case that the right was limited to “floating” on
124
the water (not stopping, wading, or fishing). This had been
the accepted interpretation and popular understanding for almost three decades. In 2008, the Utah Supreme Court in
Conatser v. Johnson abruptly eliminated riparian owners’ pri125
vate property rights to non-navigable water beds. Based on
the common law doctrine that easement owners possess the
corollary rights “to do such acts as are necessary to make effective his or her enjoyment of the easement,” the court reinterpreted the public right to “utilize” to include wading and fishing
126
while standing on private riverbeds. The holding effectively
opened fishable Utah riverbeds to anglers and to the commercial recreational angling industry by enabling wading near private shores.
Within months, Utah Representative Ben C. Ferry proposed a bill to limit the public recreational rights granted by
the Utah Supreme Court in Conatser to floating, with only incidental touching of private riverbeds, on fourteen rivers speci127
fied in the bill. Interest groups, including Utah Trout Unlimited, the Utah River Council, the newly formed Utah Water
Guardians, and the $700 million Utah commercial fishing industry responded with public protests at the State Capitol
123. The J.J.N.P. Co. court held that the Utah statute providing that all
waters are the property of the public, coupled with other statutory provisions
requiring the State Engineer to consider public recreational uses prior to approving applications for appropriation and permits for stream relocation, created an easement for the public to engage in recreational uses when utilizing
the water. 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982) (“[T]he public . . . has the right to
float leisure craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water.” (citing Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 137 (Wyo. 1961)));
see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-8 (West 2012) (application for appropriation);
id. § 73-3-29 (stream relocation permit).
124. See 655 P.2d at 1137.
125. Conatser, 194 P.3d at 902–03.
126. Id.
127. See Recreational Use of Public Waters, H.B. 187, 2009 Gen. Sess.
(Utah 2009). In addition, under the bill, the public would not be able to fish at
all within 500 feet of a single family dwelling that had posted a no fishing notice. See Public Access to Private Stream Beds, H.B. 80, 2010 Gen. Sess. (Utah
2010). A controversial aspect of the legislative process was the fact that a legislator and his family owned land on one of the rivers that would now be closed
to public fishing under Representative Ferry’s proposed bill. See Tom Wharton, Stream Bill Would Protect Lawmaker’s Land, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 25,
2009, http://www.sltrib.com/ci_11784137.
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brandishing paddles and fishing rods, meetings with repre128
sentative Ferry, and professional lobbying of the legislature.
After multiple substitutions of Ferry’s bill and twenty amendments, the bill was defeated. The following year, a more mod129
erate bill, the Utah Public Waters Access Act, was enacted.
The Public Waters Access Act restored most of the property
rights to the private riverbed owners, the original entitlement
holders. Pursuant to the statute, recreationists have the right
to touch streambeds only “incidentally” to flotation (i.e., boating, fishing from a boat, or other activities upon the surface of
130
the water). While the Public Waters Access Act mostly returned the law to the pre-Conatser state of play, it did offer
several lower-value benefits to recreationists. They gained the
right to portage (lifting and walking watercraft around obsta131
cles). Although some Utah common law precedents on public
water rights appeared to support a right of portage, the right
132
had not crystallized in the state’s common law. The Act also
created a public adverse possession right when a riverbed has
133
been used by the public for at least ten consecutive years and
prohibited private owners from stringing barbed wire across
134
the rivers to keep boaters out. Following the passage of the
Act, the Division of Wildlife sought to expand its “Walk-in Access” program, which leases land and waterbeds from private
135
owners for public access, fishing, and wading.
128. See Prettyman, supra note 120 (describing rally); Tom Wharton, Anglers Rally to Fight Stream Access Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 19, 2009, http://
archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=11744385&itype=NGPSID (quoting a representative from Utah Water Guardians about public rights); Tom Wharton, Bill
to Limit Riverbed Access Clears First Hurdle, Passes House Panel, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Feb. 23, 2009, http://archive.sltrib.com/article.php?id=11767346&itype=
NGPSID (quoting the state chair of Utah Trout Unlimited on the unfairness of
bill H.B. 187).
129. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-101 to -208 (West 2012).
130. Id. § 73-29-202.
131. Id. § 73-29-202(2)(a)–(b). The Act limits the public’s right to float in
water that on the whole has “sufficient width, depth, and flow to allow free
passage of the chosen vessel at the time of floating.” Id. § 73-29-202(1).
132. The portage right is an advance in public access rights but it accrues
to a minority of river recreational users, boaters and rafters.
133. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-29-203. The value of this benefit may turn out
to be minimal because prevailing on the adverse possession claim involves rigorous proof and an expensive legal process to quiet title. See id. § 73-29-204
(describing procedural and other requirements for a quiet title action).
134. See id. § 73-29-207(1)–(2) (limiting fencing to agricultural and livestock fences that do not endanger public water users).
135. See Walk-in Access, UTAH DIV. OF WILDLIFE RES., http://wildlife.utah
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The Utah case study reveals a more complex set of legislative motivations than the dominant rent-seeking model, where
legislatures award the political spoils to the most powerful in136
terest group. In Conatser, both the riverbed owners and the
anglers were formidable interests (the anglers included the
multi-million dollar tourist fishing industry and the powerful
137
interest group Trout Unlimited). Interest group power did not
clearly predict the outcome; the comparative strength of both
interests should have yielded a more middle of the road division of rights. Instead, the legislature appeared motivated in
substantial part to secure Utah’s constitutional takings provisions against the state supreme court’s sudden departure from
precedent and to foster political accommodation.
The legislative history and statutory declarations record
the state legislature’s frustration with the Utah Supreme Court
for, in their view, violating the state’s constitutional property
138
protections. In the statute’s declarations, the legislature took
the Conatser court to task, admonishing that the “general constitutional and statutory provisions declaring public ownership
of water and recognizing existing rights of use are insufficient
to overcome the specific constitutional protections for private
139
property.” The statute emphasized that the Utah Constitution’s “prohibition on taking or damaging private property for
public use without just compensation, protect[s] against government’s broad recognition or grant of a public recreation
140
easement to access or use public water on private property.”
Political pressure and interest group lobbying were undeniably
important to the legislature, but apparently so was the constitutional affront to private property in the Conatser decision.

.gov/walkinaccess/ (last updated Aug. 31, 2012).
136. Cf. supra note 1.
137. See Tom Wharton, Bill Would Limit Fishing Ground Access, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.sltrib.com/news/ci_11684170 (interviewing the head of the Utah Rivers Council, who described the large financial
value of Utah fishing).
138. See Jeremiah I. Williamson, Stream Wars: The Constitutionality of the
Utah Public Waters Access Act, 14 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 315, 317, 323
(2011).
139. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-29-103(1)–(2) (West 2012) (establishing water
access as a takings issue).
140. Id. § 72-29-103(3)–(6) (describing the legislature’s intent to address
the Conatser holding and restore the property rights as they existed prior to
Conatser).
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B. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE: ADVANTAGES
OF STATE LEGISLATIVE CHECKS
State legislative checks have an array of institutional
strengths. State legislatures are knowledgeable about state
property issues, competing demands and interest groups in the
state, and the preferences of the state’s citizenry and can craft
legislation accordingly. Importantly, legislative revision of state
court overreaching enables middle ground solutions, innovation, and implicit compensation for the losers in a property conflict. Legislative checks provide signals to the state’s citizens
about legislative commitments to property protection and can
create beneficial second-order effects on courts. The revisionary
role of the state legislature also creates court-legislature “networks” that may help to develop state property law as controversies pass between these institutions. These benefits weigh in
balance against the primary disadvantage of legislative
checks—the fact that checks may not occur in every instance
they are needed because of limited institutional resources or
political dynamics.
1. Intermediate Solutions and Political Accommodation
Intermediate solutions and political accommodation are
key advantages of state legislative checks—advantages which
may be muted or chilled under a federal judicial takings doctrine. Legislatures who check courts have the institutional capacity to offer middle ground solutions, often by restoring the
141
bulk, but not all, of the property right. Although not inevitably the case, legislative middle ground solutions have the potential to be more efficient and politically palatable, as well as
truer to the common law, than the binary rights determination
of a judicial taking. Legislatures can also step back from the
case at hand and address a need for comprehensive regulation
in an area of property or water law. In contrast, courts are limited by the pleadings in the particular case, legal doctrines and
precedents, and a reviewing court’s inability to craft comprehensive regulatory approaches (as opposed to iterative rules).
Contrary to intuition, legislative enactments that adopt
middle ground solutions and “split the baby” in terms of rights
may more accurately reflect the competing threads of the com141. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1009 (West 2007) (providing opportunity for
public access to property, while maintaining property owner’s rights); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 462.357 subdiv. 6(2) (West 2011).
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mon law as a whole than stylized federal judicial review of judicial takings (which would typically select a single case or line of
cases as the definitive precedent). This does not occur because
legislatures perceive their mission as interpreting the common
law. Rather, it occurs because the common law frequently implicates interests in investment, stability, and fairness of the
kind that legislatures consider—and because the underlying
judicial decision and lobbying interest groups bring relevant
142
precedents to the legislature’s attention. In many areas, including water law, the common law includes a multitude of
precedents and the holdings are multiplex, waxing and waning,
143
or checkered. Federal court appellate review of a judicial takings claim would likely select a single “correct” common law
rule from the relevant precedents. But is this a superior method of common law interpretation? In some instances, a checkered pattern or competing threads to the common law may
support a legislative rule that “sums” the various precedents
into an intermediate or hybrid approach not specifically articulated in prior precedents.
Intermediate solutions also allow political accommodation
and “paying off losers,” a critical aspect of property rights tran144
sitions described in Gary Libecap’s work. Fifth Amendment
compensation for judicial takings is not the only way to compensate for property transitions. State legislatures can, and often do, craft intermediate solutions that pay off losers through
implicit or non-monetary compensation. As Thomas Merrill and
Henry Smith note, “legislature[s] can devise various means for
affording implicit compensation to those adversely affected by
the change . . . . [C]ourts will often not have the losers before
them and in any event are endowed with a limited set of op145
tions in devising remedies.” A common outcome of a legislative check of a state court decision is to restore most or all of
the private property entitlement and to offer some mitigating
142. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW
144–45 (1988).
143. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, The Future of Prior Appropriation in the
New West, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 769, 770–71 (2001) (describing the evolution
of the water law doctrine of prior appropriation).
144. Gary Libecap has most famously illustrated the importance of paying
off losers in his study of oil field unitization. See Gary Libecap et al., Contracting for Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND
LAW 142, 156–64 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003).
145. Merrill & Smith, supra note 63, at 65.
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rights, benefits, or other form of compensation to the losers in a
146
property rights conflict. For example, the statute overturning
Conatser provided recreationists with portage rights, adverse
possession rights for longstanding public use, and redress for
the problem of private owners stringing barbed wire across riv147
ers. This is not to say the losers in this dispute were perfectly
satisfied (they are presently litigating the constitutionality of
148
the legislative revision). However, the legislative process offered them a forum and certain benefits that may not have occurred if the riparian owners succeeded in a judicial takings
claim.
Compared to federal judicial review, the process of state
legislative revision is a more democratic and, at times, a more
politically palatable resolution. Legislatures are close to state
citizens’ and interest groups’ sentiments and can use that information in crafting solutions and offering implicit compensa149
tion. William Marshall has lauded judicial review of legislation as “end[ing] the debate without the possibility of political
compromise. . . . [making it] far more definitive in defeating the
popular will than are the other countermajoritarian struc150
tures.” However, in the context of property rights, which are
often high-stakes, contested by multiple claimants, and subject
to competing threads in the common law, it is often not a simple story of majoritarian wrongdoing, but rather a complex and
opaque array of conflicting interests. The legislative check, informed by public input and interest group lobbying and subject
to later judicial review, may move us closer to a property distribution that balances property protection, political senti151
ments, and social needs.
146. The balance between accommodation and rights restoration is a
fraught one, as evidenced by the Utah legislature’s statement of its intent “to
foster restoration of the accommodation existing between recreational users
and private property owners before the decision in Conatser v. Johnson.” UTAH
CODE ANN. § 73-29-103(6) (West 2012).
147. See supra notes 131–34 and accompanying text.
148. See Utah Stream Access Coal. v. ATC Realty, No. 100500558, slip op.
(Utah Dist. Ct. May 21, 2012).
149. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from
One Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100
HARV. L. REV. 887, 898 (1987) (describing Roscoe Pound’s belief that “legislation was the most democratic form of lawmaking,” and that the common law
“could not address the needs of modern society”).
150. See Marshall, supra note 38, at 30.
151. For example, following legislative revision of the Utah Supreme Court
decision redistributing private property rights in riverbeds to the public, the
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2. Framing Legislation and Public Acceptance: The Example
of Gion v. City of Santa Cruz
State legislatures can increase political acceptance of necessary revisions of state court decisions by emphasizing the
consensus elements of a property rule or the benefits to the
public of stable private property rights. Gion v. City of Santa
Cruz offers an instructive example of such framing. In the consolidated cases of Gion v. City of Santa Cruz and Dietz v. King,
the California Supreme Court departed dramatically from past
precedents and extended the common law of implied dedication,
previously applied only to roadways, to create a public recrea152
tional easement in private beaches. If members of the public
walked across or used private beachfront property for more
than five years, believing they had the right to such use and
with no bona fide attempt by the landowner to exclude them,
then the public acquired recreational use rights through im153
plied dedication. Soon after Gion, a California lower court reduced landowner compensation for a condemnation because it
held that most of the area was subject to an implied dedication
154
based on past public use. The change in the common law was
so radical that Michael Berger, writing in a 1971 law review article, charged that the Gion court had violated the constitution155
al prohibition on takings.
The California Supreme Court in Gion had premised their
decision in part on the importance of assuring public access to

newly founded Utah Stream Access Coalition is currently appealing the legislative enactment on the theory that the Act violates Article XVII of the Utah
Constitution, which recognizes, “[a]ll existing rights to the use of any of the
waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose” and that existing
rights at the time of statehood included public riverbed access. UTAH CONST.
art. XVII; see also Williamson, supra note 138, at 329–33.
152. 465 P.2d 50, 60–61 (Cal. 1970). This case was a radical change from
prior state precedents. See Breidert v. S. Pac. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 262, 268 (Ct.
App. 1969); People v. Lundy, 47 Cal. Rptr. 694, 696 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
153. See Gion, 465 P.2d at 56–58. Notably, the California Supreme Court
held that intermittently posting no trespassing signs was not adequate in the
specific cases before it, because the signs “cannot reasonably be expected to
halt a continuous influx of beach users to an attractive seashore property.” Id.
at 58.
154. Richard E. Llewellyn II, The Common Law Doctrine of Implied Dedication and Its Effect on the California Coastline Property Owner: Gion v. City
of Santa Cruz, 4 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 438, 447 (1971).
155. Michael M. Berger, Nice Guys Finish Last—At Least They Lose Their
Property: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 8 CAL. W. L. REV. 75, 93–94 (1971).
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156

the waterfront. However, the case had the opposite effect.
Beachfront property owners immediately began to block public
access, with news reports of owners building fences topped with
barbed wire or with cactuses spread across the base, implanting traps such as old automobile transmissions in the ground to
157
block vehicles, and hiring guards.
The California legislature responded with laws that reversed the California Supreme Court by prohibiting public use
of private property from ripening into a vested right unless the
owner had made an express written irrevocable offer of dedica158
tion. The statute focused on the benefits to the public of removing the threat to beachfront owners’ private property. It
began with the finding that “[i]t is in the best interests of the
state to encourage owners of private real property to continue
159
to make their lands available for public recreational use . . . .”
The next findings elaborated on the unintended consequence to
the public of the Court’s decision and described how the threatened loss of private rights compelled owners to exclude the pub160
lic. Californians at the time were likely not poring over the
statutory text. However, the legislature’s reasoning about protecting public access by protecting private rights was the product of a series of public deliberations that were highly publi161
cized by the media throughout the state. By framing the
political discourse and statute to emphasize how restoration of
private rights benefited the public, the legislature increased the
legitimacy and public acceptance of the enactment.

156. See Gion, 465 P.2d at 58 (describing as a basis for their decision the
“strong policy expressed in the constitution and statutes of this state of encouraging public use of shoreline recreational areas”).
157. See Michael A. O’Flaherty, This Land Is My Land: The Doctrine of
Implied Dedication and Its Application to California Beaches, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1092, 1094–95 (1971); Philip Fradkin, Fences Go up to Keep Public from
Beaches, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1971, at C1; Philip Fradkin, Owners of Waterway Property Rushing to Block Access Paths, L.A. TIMES, July 23, 1970, pt. I,
at 3, 25.
158. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1009(b) (West 2012). Other provisions further reassured owners with clear safe harbors enabling them to record a document on
the public record permitting public access and barring the creation of a prescriptive easement when the property owner has posted signs every 200 feet
along the boundary granting a right to pass. See id. §§ 813, 1008.
159. Id. § 1009(a)(1).
160. See id. § 1009(a)(2)–(3).
161. See supra note 157.

2013]

JUDICIAL TAKINGS

2211

3. The Fast Train: State Legislative Revision
For structural and political reasons, state legislatures act
more quickly than the federal legislature and certainly more
rapidly than the litigation process envisioned by the Stop the
162
Beach plurality. Judicial takings involve a lengthy process
with multiple rounds of litigation, removal to federal court, and
the potential for prudential issues to short-circuit adjudication.
For example, in Robinson v. Ariyoshi, a case that commentators
point to as an instructive example of the need for a constitutional judicial takings doctrine, the litigation of the judicial taking claim lasted for decades before foundering on ripeness con163
cerns. The only relief the plaintiffs received was from the
Hawaii legislature, which partially restored their rights
164
through grandfathering provisions in the Water Code.
Most legislative checks of state court property activism occur in less than two years. In Conatser, legislation was proposed seven months after the state supreme court decision and
165
enacted eleven months later. The California legislature responded to Gion with an enactment in approximately eighteen
166
months.
The
Minnesota
legislature
rectified
the
Krummenacher decision, discussed in detail in Part III, in less
167
than two years. Indeed, one might question why, since legislative checks are so timely, litigants will bother to file judicial
appeals and why judicial takings will matter at all. This view
discounts strategic litigation decisions to appeal or threaten
appeal, the possible compensation benefits from judicial takings claims, and the potential for judicial takings doctrine to
“crowd out” state legislative checks by providing justifications
for legislative inaction. Also, legislative checks are likely to be
slower, or not occur at all, when there is strong political support for the court’s reallocation of private rights or when the

162. A case where a judicial taking, or at least a close relation, was raised
as a claim was Robinson v. Ariyoshi. 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989). This case
wound its way through both state and federal courts for decades without resolution, repeatedly derailing on issues of ripeness and other concerns. Id. at
216.
163. Id. at 216–18 (describing lengthy history of the case).
164. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-50 (2008).
165. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-29-101 to -208 (West 2010).
166. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1009(b) (West 2012).
167. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357, subdiv. 6 (West 2011).
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state is attempting to resolve complex property rights distribu168
tions (e.g., creating a comprehensive water rights statute).
4. Legislative Signaling to Citizens
State legislative checks of judicial overreaching also have
expressive value. Legislative checks are “costly signals” that
indicate that legislators disapprove of and will expend substantial legislative resources to redress radical property rights redistribution by courts. Independent state legislative checks
(i.e., not arising from federal order or the shadow of judicial
takings liability) may assuage citizens’ concerns about the legislature’s position on property protection and judicial activism.
Checks which substantially revise court opinions but offer some
accommodations for public interests communicate the legislature’s commitment to protecting private property rights while
also safeguarding public and environmental interests. Plausibly, these assurances of property protection may even increase
tolerance for more modest property rights flux, at least if citizens interpret such signals to indicate that legislatures will adjust property rights modestly and in socially beneficial ways,
but not radically disrupt property rights or dispossess broad
169
swathes of owners. Notably, legislative checks need not respond to every questionable judicial action to yield these benefits. The most controversial and highly publicized court cases
are the ones most likely to capture citizen attention and to produce a legislative check and signal.
Signaling suggests the value of the seemingly ineffectual
and symbolic state legislative responses following Kelo v. City
170
of New London. It may be that even weak legislation communicated state government concern about private property rights
protection and legislative reluctance to support an economic
development taking of the scope and nature of the New London
redevelopment. The primary motivation for these laws may
171
have been to garner public approval. However, the extensive
168. Cf. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2168–69 (2009) (discussing effect of
public political ignorance on state legislative action following the Kelo decision).
169. See id. at 2170 (concluding that most state legislation enacted after
Kelo was ineffective).
170. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
171. See Somin, supra note 168, at 2165 (explaining how “state legislatures
[sought] to satisfy vote demands by supporting . . . legislation that purported
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process of lawmaking, including well-publicized hearings and
statements by public officials, provided reassurances to citizens
that property protection mattered to their legislators. Of
course, the value of the legislative signal is not divorced entirely from content—strong substantive laws increase the strength
and sincerity of the signal. In the context of legislative checks,
which are not symbolic but instead reverse or substantially revise court property redistributions, the signal to the state’s citizenry about legislative intent and the limits on state courts is
typically quite robust.
5. Second-Order Effects on State Courts and State Law
Development
The legislative check means that courts act in the shadow
of substantive legislative revision as well as jurisdictionstripping legislation (and in turn, that legislatures act subject
to judicial review). Legislative checks provide ongoing disincentives for judicial radicalism with respect to private property
rights. This is not due to generalized state court deference to
legislatures, but because state courts act in the shadow of permanent legislative alteration of the law. These dynamics may
not always be an optimal state of judging or of public-private
property law development. But from the perspective of private
property protection—the relevant lens for the issue of judicial
takings—they are a significant deterrent for state court activism.
Judges acting strategically to develop property law in a
specific direction may behave more conservatively or incrementally because a legislative response may resolve the issue in a
172
disfavored direction. Modern empirical and legal research has
refined the claims of legal realism through studies of judges
acting either “attitudinally” to effectuate their ideological positions in the instant case or “strategically” to prevent backlash
173
and advance their ideological agendas long-term. In the conto curb eminent domain, while in reality having little effect”).
172. Cf. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 60 (1997)
(discussing strategic policy decisions of judges); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 15–23 (1964) (discussing the sources and instruments of judicial power).
173. Compare Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 832–35 (2008) (describing “attitudinal” judging
behavior), with MURPHY, supra note 172, at 50 (describing how judges influence policy over time), and Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least
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text of judicial property activism, the prospect of permanent
legislative revision constrains in-the-moment, attitudinal judging that might favor elimination of private rights or radical redistributions in favor of stability or strategic incrementalism.
In addition, a legislative check greatly increases negative
publicity and public scrutiny of the state court judge—a signifi174
cant matter in an age of judicial recalls. If the judicial action
is extreme enough to prompt the legislature to action, there has
likely been media attention already. A legislative revision process increases that attention exponentially and prolongs it over
many months. Such publicity, coupled with the implication of
judicial wrongdoing suggested by some forms of legislative revision, can tarnish a judge’s reputation or motivate attempts to
oust a judge through retention election recall (if state law ena175
bles recall). While publicity and politics may not fully or invariably constrain state court judges, undeniably they have a
forestalling effect some of the time.
Legislative checks and the bi-directional interaction between state courts and legislatures are also important to developing and defining state property law. By this I mean not only
the content of the legislative revision, which of course becomes
part of state property law, but also the legislative check as an
indicator of the degree of property flux and disrupted investment that a state will accept. For example, the federal constitutional regulatory takings test and many state counterparts
weigh “reasonable” investment-backed expectations, based on
state law, to determine whether a state or local regulation is a
176
regulatory taking. A state legislature that is quick to revise
court overreaching signals a thicker approach to property
rights protection that affects the property expectations component of the regulatory takings test. As I will discuss in Part III,
the Stop the Beach plurality’s judicial takings doctrine places
the legislature under direct federal court order, financial duress, or both to invalidate the state court decision (or to comDangerous Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness
to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1019 (2004) (“[S]trategic justices must
gauge the prevailing winds . . . politicians and make decisions accordingly.”).
174. See Hobbs, Jr., supra note 99, at 140–43 (discussing the publicity of
state supreme court decisions and the impact on re-election).
175. See Pettys, supra note 97, at 70–72 (discussing various recent attempts to oust judges in retention elections).
176. For a description of how this approach represents implicit delegations
to state law and courts, see Sterk, supra note 29, at 206, 231.
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pensate). State legislative action in these circumstances does
not send a clear signal about state legislative norms of property
protection.
The interplay between state legislatures and courts may
develop property law in other ways. The current system of state
legislative checks of judicial overreaching may encourage more
deliberative or balanced development of state property law
than a system of revision situated predominantly within the
judiciary. Legislative checks of state court decisions, and potential later judicial review of the legislative revision, create multiple inputs and checks that may tend to stabilize property
rights, or at least discourage radical action by one branch. Todd
Zywicki’s work on the efficiency-enhancing effects of supply
side competition among courts on the common law suggests another benefit: multiple inputs can improve the quality of law
177
production. He offers a historical account of how competition
between common law courts motivated judges to carefully conceptualize and abstract the common law and encouraged high178
quality rules and internal coherence.
Unlike systems of overlapping common law courts, state
legislatures and state courts do not compete for clients. Indeed,
both might prefer not to have a property law dispute deposited
on their institutional doorsteps. However, the fact that state
legislatures have the authority to revise non-constitutional
property decisions of state courts creates an analogous jurisdictional overlap. As property disputes bounce between courts and
legislatures, it may force both institutions to abstract the principles and interests underlying property law and to think more
conceptually and carefully about state law development. For
example, following the legislature’s revision of Conatser, the issue is presently back in state trial court to determine the constitutionality of the new statute and to clarify the scope of the
legislature’s constitutional review role under the Utah Consti179
tution. This back and forth between state legislative revision
and state court review can be a valuable part of refining and
legitimizing legislative solutions (as well as clarifying state
separation of powers).
177. See Todd Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law:
A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551, 1586 (2003).
178. See id.
179. See Utah Stream Access Coal. v. ATC Realty, No. 100500558, slip op.
(Utah Dist. Ct. May 21, 2012).
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C. GAPS IN STATE LEGISLATIVE CHECKS: ROBINSON V. ARIYOSHI
REVISITED
Legislative checks address state court overreaching without the costs of judicial takings doctrine to common law development and takings federalism. However, legislative checks do
not work invariably or infallibly. Public choice dynamics and
180
legislative inertia may stymie legislative correction. Contextspecific politics and circumstances can create instability within
the political process or political capture that produces dysfunc181
tional legislative responses. Legislative checks are also unlikely to occur when the court decision validates or otherwise
benefits a statute or regulatory scheme supported by a majority
of the state legislature. These dynamics underscore the importance of state court restraint and the doctrinal and political
forces supporting judicial conservatism with respect to property
rights.
In many cases, vigorous interest group politics reduces the
risk that legislative checks will fail to occur. Natural resource
and water law cases comprise the majority of “activist” state
supreme court property cases. These are virtually always highstakes cases with multiple interested parties vigorously defend182
ing their claims. Similarly, land use litigation often involves
strong interests on both sides of a dispute and frequently impli183
cates the legal rights of parties not before the court. As Daniel Farber and Carol Rose have observed, property litigants are
often “discrete and insular minorities” with surprising, and often superior, power compared to the diffuse majorities who in
many cases are the beneficiaries and would-be defenders of
180. Conversely, relying on state legislative checks may raise concerns that
state legislatures will overuse legislative revision to undermine judicial review. The high costs of legislative action, state constitutional restrictions, and
judicial review of legislative revisions sharply constrain such behavior from
legislatures. This type of litigation is presently ongoing in Utah following the
legislature’s revision of the law based on the Conatser holding. See supra note
179.
181. See, e.g., Poirier, supra note 114, at 247 (discussing the politics of
beachfront property law and policy development).
182. See Tarlock, supra note 143, at 773–74.
183. As Stewart Sterk notes in his discussion of legislative takings and
state political process, “developers and local governments are both active in
local politics . . . . Takings questions are a far cry from free speech or equal
protection controversies that typically pit a disenfranchised individual with an
unpopular cause against the power of the state.” Sterk, supra note 29, at 235;
see also FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 4 (persuasively arguing that state legislative
process provides substantial protection against legislative takings).
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184

state enactments. State statutes imposing limits on regulatory takings, requiring impact assessments, and restricting development moratoria attest to the influence of landowners and
185
developers in state politics. In addition, robust (though not
unqualified) public disapproval of private property redistribution, as well as the growing number of private property protection groups, increases the responsiveness of state legisla186
tures. Apart from public choice pressures, legislators may
also act upon their personal commitments to property protection.
Notably, some cases that might at first appear as failed
187
legislative checks, such as State ex. rel. Thornton v. Hay or
188
Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Assoc., on closer view do
not appear to have escaped legislative revision due to political
capture or legislative indolence. Rather, these court decisions
and the legislature’s acceptance of them reflect common intuitions across state institutions about issues such as preserving
long-standing public access rights or preventing de facto racial
189
segregation on beaches. In other cases, reciprocal gains, or
“givings,” to owners deprived of their rights by courts mitigate
190
harm and eliminate the need for a legislative response. Litigants alleging a “judicial taking” may not merit compensation
under a regulatory-takings style analysis of social benefits
compared to the net loss (i.e., after subtracting gains to owners)
191
imposed on an owner by a state court. The plaintiffs in Stop
the Beach, for example, did not have to pay for extremely expensive beach restoration and maintenance provided by the
192
state.

184. See Farber, supra note 29, at 289; Rose, supra note 111, at 1136.
185. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 257–60.
186. See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 83, at 96; Nadler et al., supra note 83, at
286–89; NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., supra note 83, at Q15.
187. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969); see supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text
(discussing the Thornton case).
188. 471 A.2d 355 (N.J. 1984); see supra note 57 and accompanying text
(discussing the Bay Head case).
189. See supra Part I.A.
190. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547,
555 (2001) (conceptualizing government acts that enhance value within takings theory).
191. See Fennell, supra note 14, at 109–14.
192. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2600, 2010–13 (2010).
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While legislative gaps may be more confined than a pure
public choice model would predict, on occasion a court may deprive a litigant of property, and the litigant may not receive relief because a legislative check does not occur (or because statu193
tory relief does not apply retrospectively). The fact that on
occasion an individual property owner may not receive recompense from a change in the common law is less calamitous if
one takes a social rather than individual perspective on property rights and judicial takings. Regulatory takings doctrine, for
example, privileges social interests over absolutist protection
by weighing public interests in its balancing test and focusing
takings liability on acts that “single out” owners for very large
194
diminutions in property value. This perspective focuses on
the legal superstructure of property rights, and the protection
of property and other values, by balancing social and individual
interests—not on the invariable protection or compensation of
195
owners for every state incursion. From this vantage, the fact
that from time to time an owner may not receive compensation
or other relief following a judicial decision “taking” property
rights may be the toll for avoiding the larger costs to property
common law and social goals from a robust judicial takings doctrine.
A particular point of vulnerability in a legislative process
model is that legislatures are less likely to revise state court
decisions that validate or prevent takings liability for state enactments. At first glance this appears to be a looming hole in
the legislative process theory, but upon closer examination the
problem is more confined. First, there are multiple circumstances in which legislatures may check their own statutory
193. For example, a recent case of an owner losing beachfront property
rights dates to the period after the court decision allowing public access by adverse possession in Gion v. City of Santa Cruz but before the legislative revision. See Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Implied Acceptance, by Public Use, of
Dedication of Beach or Shoreline Adjoining Public Waters, 24 A.L.R. 4th 294
(1983); Prescriptive Rights: Recreational Trail Users Win Right to Access Dirt
Road, CAL. PLAN. & DEV. REP. (Apr. 1, 2000, 1:00 AM), http://www.cp-dr.com/
node/1305.
194. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–41 (2005); see
also Kent, Jr., supra note 16, at 157–66 (considering how judicial takings fits
within the Lingle regulatory takings framework). As the Supreme Court has
made clear, absolute redress for any property infringement, no matter how
small, is the exclusive doctrinal domain of physical takings by the legislature.
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425–
27 (1982).
195. I thank Robert Post for his comments on this point.
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schemes or regulations, such as when the political winds have
shifted the legislature’s initial support of an act, the legislature
is divided, the statute is dated and the legislature feels no particular affinity toward it, or interest group pressure has become
overwhelming. For alleged judicial takings in cases addressing
state agency regulations, the legislature may be quite willing to
check its own enactments if it disagrees with an agency action.
Second, as discussed in Part I, even if the legislature supports
the enactment and is unlikely to check a judicial decision supporting it, there is little reason to presume, as some scholars
have suggested, that courts are in danger of coordinating with
196
the legislature to wrongfully uphold enactments. Last, it is
noteworthy that often the cases that seem to be the best candidates for the appellation judicial takings focus on common law
questions rather than state enactments, or interpret statutes in
a way that expands the law in a direction that either is disfa197
vored by the legislature or off the legislative radar screen.
The true Achilles heel of legislative checks is likely not in-state
public choice failure, but the inadequacy of state political process to protect out-of-state property interests (a point I take up
in Part IV).
On the benefit side, one advantage of the variability of legislative revision is the potential for legislative filtering of
claims. State legislatures can efficiently filter out, or not respond to, alleged judicial takings originating from court decisions that increase rather than diminish property values (the
“givings problem”), eliminate negligible rights, or convey strong
198
social benefits. In comparison, the judicial takings doctrine
articulated by the Stop the Beach plurality does not distinguish
between major versus minor rights appropriations, and offers
no standard for distinguishing between the elimination versus
199
clarification of common law rights. Concededly, exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction of judicial takings claims would also
serve as a filter. However, the Court’s history of property case
196. Cf. Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 328–29.
197. See supra Part I.A. But see County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d
57, 57–58 (1973) (affirming the eminent domain acquisition of ocean front
property under a Hawaii state statute).
198. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 190.
199. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601–10 (2010). Even if a reformulated judicial takings doctrine were to address these problems, it would reduce but not eliminate the
costs to common law development and judicial resources.
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selection, and its decisions in those cases, do not consistently
track metrics such as economic value, political will, efficiency,
or the magnitude of violations of individual rights (e.g., federal
regulatory takings doctrine makes it nearly impossible for affected owners to state claims that merit Supreme Court review
and to prevail, while the Court’s physical takings doctrine does
not distinguish between minute versus major government takings). In addition, for third-party claims by individuals who are
affected by a judicial taking but were not parties to the underlying state court litigation, the Stop the Beach plurality opinion
leaves open the prospect of lower federal court review (if the fi200
201
nal decision rule from Williamson County does not apply).
Turning to the case law, the Hawaii case Robinson v.
Ariyoshi, famous as an example of a judicial taking, also exemplifies how legislative revision may partially restore property
rights despite strong popular support for the state supreme
202
court’s redistribution.
This case suggests that the public
choice dynamics surrounding state legislative checks are more
complicated and difficult to predict than assumed. Legislative
revision can occur in the face of strong political support for the
court decision, although in such cases legislative action may be
slower and restore rights only partially.
The dispute in Robinson v. Ariyoshi began in 1959 as an
unremarkable squabble between sugar companies as to their
203
respective water rights in the Hanapepe River. In McBryde
Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Robinson, the Hawaii Supreme Court affirmed the sugar companies’ appurtenant water rights to take
the non-surplus water flow, but sua sponte held that all surplus
water in the state, including the normal, storm, and freshet

200. See Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 187 (1985) (“[A] claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of property is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final
decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”).
201. See Stop the Beach, 130 S. Ct. at 2609–10; see also Bloom & Serkin,
supra note 17, at 604–08 (discussing forum considerations for third-party
claimants).
202. 658 P.2d 287 (Haw. 1982) (reviewing alleged judicial taking in
McBryde Sugar Co., Ltd. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1973)); see also infra notes 217–21 and accompanying text (explaining that the Ariyoshi plaintiffs’ rights were partially restored through grandfathering provisions implemented in Hawaii’s Water Code in 1987).
203. See Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d at 292–93 (describing procedural history).
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surpluses, was the property of the state. The Hawaii Supreme Court also held that landowners adjacent to the streams
could not transfer their water to other parcels outside the watershed, reversing the sugar plantation owners’ longstanding
private right to transport water via irrigation systems to other
205
areas. The decision abruptly reversed nearly a hundred years
of legal treatment of surplus water rights as private property.
This history of water rights was a source of much bitterness
206
and conflict in the state. Water privatization had followed the
overthrow of the Hawaii kingdom, the conquest of land and water rights, and the reversal of customary Hawaiian law of
207
communal ownership of water.
After an unsuccessful rehearing before the Hawaii Supreme Court, the sugar companies challenged the decision in
208
federal district court. In Robinson v. Ariyoshi, the federal district court heard the sugar companies’ claims that the Hawaii
Supreme Court had violated substantive due process (the judicial taking claim) and procedural due process and enjoined
209
state officials from enforcing McBryde.
Subsequently, the
Ninth Circuit certified questions back to the Hawaii Supreme
Court about the meaning of state ownership of surplus waters
210
in McBryde. The Hawaii Supreme Court then sidestepped the
judicial taking issue by holding that state ownership of the water did not refer to corporeal ownership (which would be a tak204. 504 P.2d at 1339–41.
205. Id. at 1339.
206. Since 1894, following the overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii, private
water rights replaced the prior Hawaiian custom of communal ownership of
water. While the surplus rights were well-established in the sense of being
relatively longstanding, the legal validity of this regime, and the legitimacy of
the business interest-dominated courts of that period, was controversial (especially because the private rights pre-dated Hawaiian statehood). See Ariyoshi,
658 P.2d at 306–08. For a fascinating discussion of the history of Hawaiian
water rights, and the perspective of the Hawaii Supreme Court written by the
former counsel to the Hawaiian Chief Justice Richards at the time of the Robinson cases, see Williamson B.C. Chang, Judicial Takings: Robinson v.
Ariyoshi Revisited, 21 WIDENER L.J. 655, 682–706 (2012) (concluding that the
McBryde holding was a “corrective decision [that] restored communal water
practices in place of private ownership of water,” and that the case would not
have been a judicial taking under the plurality’s test in Stop the Beach because private rights to surplus water were not sufficiently established in Hawaiian law).
207. See Chang, supra note 206, at 697–704.
208. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977).
209. See id. at 564.
210. See Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d at 292–94.
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ing) but rather reaffirmed the State’s common law public trust
211
rights over state waters. Functionally, the result was the
same for the owners whose former private water rights were
now public trust rights vested in the state. However, the fact
that the state had not taken ownership but rather asserted
longstanding background public trust rights meant that the
matter was not constitutionally ripe as a taking. Additional
court proceedings followed, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s
order to the federal courts to reconsider the case in light of Wil212
liamson County, and the federal district court’s subsequent
213
finding that the case was ripe for decision and possible relief.
Finally, in 1989, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case for lack
214
of ripeness. After decades, the litigation petered out without
resolution of the judicial taking claim.
As it turns out, the only relief that the former owners received was from the state legislature. Despite tremendous majoritarian support in Hawaii for the redistribution of private
rights from the sugar companies to the state, the legislature
215
acted to partially restore the private water rights. Following
the litigation, the legislature and executive branches did not
enforce the Hawaii Supreme Court’s decision and the sugar
216
companies continued to use the surplus water. The Hawaii
Supreme Court decision establishing public trust rights wiped
the legal slate sufficiently clean for the legislature over several
211. See id. at 310.
212. See Ariyoshi v. Robinson, 477 U.S. 902, 902 (1986). The 1985 Supreme
Court decision in Williamson County held that a takings claim is not ripe until
the government entity charged with the taking has reached a final decision as
to how it will apply the regulation to the land in question. See Williamson
Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172,
191 (1985).
213. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp. 1002, 1020–21, 1023–24 (D. Haw.
1987).
214. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215, 219 (9th Cir. 1989) (“To date,
the State has not interfered in any way with the parties’ use or diversions of
the waters of the Hanapepe and its tributaries. . . . [E]ven if the State of Hawaii has placed a cloud on the title of the various private owners, this inchoate
and speculative cloud is insufficient to make this controversy ripe for review.”).
215. See infra notes 217–21 and accompanying text. The strong popular
support for redistribution derived from the oligopoly of the sugar companies
and bitter conflicts as to the validity of the plantation owners’ rights in light of
Hawaii’s troubled history of native land dispossession. See generally Chang,
supra note 206, at 697–704.
216. See Interview with Williamson B.C. Chang, Professor of Law, Univ. of
Haw. at Mānoa William S. Richardson Sch. of Law (July 25, 2012).
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years to complete a comprehensive state water code and to restore some of the sugar companies’ water rights. As this case
illustrates, legislative revision need not be exclusively motivated by a state court decision in order to address a judicial taking. The owners’ rights in Robinson v. Ariyoshi were one item
in a larger legislative agenda motivating the enactment of the
Water Code.
The amended Water Code created a permit system that
grandfathered in existing users, including the plantation own217
ers in Robinson v. Ariyoshi. The permits were transferable, in
whole or part, and remained indefinitely in effect without re218
newal obligations. The Water Code also restored the right to
transfer water outside the watershed from which it was tak219
en. The practical impact was that the former private owners,
such as the sugar companies, received about half of the water
they had previously had rights to under the pre-McBryde water
220
rights regime. In essence, the Water Code effected a compromise. Users who had lost their vested common law rights in
McBryde gained much-needed clarity and certainty about their
property rights as well as durable, generous permits that allowed them to continue a large share of their prior water ap221
propriation. The state gained greater control over water usage and the legal authority to manage water through the
permit system in order to prevent resource degradation and
harm to downstream users. In this case, coalition politics and
logrolling yielded a viable intermediate solution to judicial activism and to the state’s distribution of public and private water rights.

217. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 174C-50 (West 2008).
218. See id. § 174C-55 (providing that each permit is valid until the designation of the water management area is rescinded); id. § 174C-59 (providing
that transfers are allowed with the same permit conditions). The Water Code
limited permit revocation to cases where the commission rescinded the water
management area designation, the permit holder engaged in partial or total
non-use of the water, or the permit holder otherwise violated the application
or permit requirements. See id. § 174C-58(1)–(4) (providing rules for the revocation of permits).
219. See id. § 174C-49(a) (conditions for a permit).
220. See Interview with Williamson B.C. Chang, supra note 216.
221. See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text (discussing the
McBryde case).
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III. POTENTIAL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF
JUDICIAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE
The public debate and legal scholarship have focused on
how judicial takings will chill state courts’ development of
222
property common law. Yet, the harms to property law also
derive from the potential of judicial takings to alter or mute
legislative checks and the legislative role in developing state
property law. Depending on the degree of financial liability and
political pressure confronting the state legislature, judicial takings may alter the likelihood of legislative revision, chill intermediate legislative solutions, crowd out legislators’ constitutional property commitments, or create duplicative and
overlapping federal court and state legislative revision processes. In theory, the same problems afflict federal court review of
due process claims of state court wrongdoing. However, under
the Stop the Beach plurality’s expansive definition and likely
remedy of compensation, a federal judicial takings doctrine is
likely to create many more claims, and correspondingly more
223
state legislative distortions, than federal due process.
A. THE LIKELIHOOD OF INDEPENDENT STATE LEGISLATURE
REVISION
The Stop the Beach plurality proposed that if the Supreme
Court finds a state court has eliminated an established common law property right, it would invalidate the decision as applied to the litigants (typically this would functionally invalidate the statutory provision or relevant doctrine altogether).
The state legislature would then have the choice to either pay
compensation or acquiesce in the invalidation of the state court
224
decision. The Stop the Beach plurality opinion did not clarify
225
whether First English creates interim judicial takings liabil222. See, e.g., Dogan & Young, supra note 4, at 107–08.
223. This is particularly true because the judicial takings standard in Stop
the Beach is expansive and may not include countervailing considerations,
such as the public value of the government’s action and reciprocity of advantage to the private owner. See generally Kent, Jr., supra note 16, at 158–68
(comparing judicial takings doctrine with the Lingle regulatory takings
framework).
224. For a pure common law case, not involving a statute or regulation, it
is not clear whether the Stop the Beach plurality contemplates federal court
invalidation, a matter of some constitutional tension, or the arguably even
stranger situation of the case returning to the state court with the legislature
now involved in the judicial (or legislative?) compensation decision.
225. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of
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ity for the period from the judicial decision until its invalidation—another devil in the details of judicial takings doctrine.
The likelihood that state legislatures will act spontaneously (i.e., not under federal court order) to revise judicial activism
depends on whether First English applies and creates state liability for interim takings damages. It also depends on the degree of political pressure or exigent need for legislative action
to correct a court decision as well as the likelihood of federal
review (i.e., whether the Supreme Court, with its limited docket, has exclusive jurisdiction over judicial takings claims or
whether litigants or third parties can raise their claims before
lower federal courts). When there are easy political gains from
legislative revision or practical necessity to act, legislatures are
likely to respond regardless of judicial takings doctrine—
indeed, in some cases, legislators may gain political capital by
acting immediately to right the judicial wrong. However, in
these cases, as I will discuss in Part III.D, legislative action
and a judicial taking appeal may overlap and lead to duplicative action and wasted resources.
If First English does not apply and the political pressure on
the legislature is not overwhelming, state legislatures may be
less likely to be first movers that initiate checks of state court
activism independent of a federal court order to do so. In these
circumstances, judicial takings doctrine provides “political cover” that allows legislatures to more easily evade or forestall
public demands for action. A politically risk-averse or inert legislature now has the ready excuse that a federal court will be
addressing the problem or that these claims are rightfully a
matter for judicial review. Thus, in certain circumstances, judicial takings may reduce the involvement of institutions that are
democratically accountable to the state’s citizens and expert in
the state’s property law—state legislatures. Of course, the Stop
the Beach plurality approach draws state legislatures into the
process by returning the Supreme Court’s or lower federal
court’s judgment of a judicial taking to the legislature to acquiesce in the invalidation or pay compensation. However, this
form of federally-coerced state legislative involvement (which
will typically result in invalidation) will tend to be formulaic
and hollow, both substantively and in its expressive value to
the state’s citizens.

Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).
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If First English does apply and creates state liability for
temporary takings damages, the incentives for state legislative
action are very different. In this scenario, state legislatures
have incentives to act quickly to revise state court judgments
that threaten substantial takings liability and loss of state revenue (more strongly so if there is lower federal court review as
opposed to exclusive Supreme Court jurisdiction). Indeed, if
First English applies, it is quite possible that risk-averse state
legislatures will overreact and revise too many state court opinions, or revise them too severely, thereby chilling the develop226
ment of the common law. First English interim judicial takings liability may also distort legislative responses by
encouraging legislative revision when there appears to be a low
probability that the state court action was a judicial taking but
huge financial liability under First English if a federal court
later disagrees. The costliness of legislative process mitigates
legislative overrevision of state court decisions to a degree (i.e.,
legislatures will compare the costs of revision to the expected
value of temporary takings damages). However, state legislatures can reduce their costs of revision through steps such as
creating state positions or institutions to monitor courts and
formulate revisions for legislative vote.
Both with and without First English liability, there are expressive and symbolic losses to state citizens from judicial takings doctrine. As discussed previously, state legislatures that
act as independent first movers to address judicial property activism express, or signal, the legislature’s position on property
rights stability and their intentions to avoid radical redistribu227
tions. Federal judicial takings liability mutes the expressive
and symbolic value of state legislative checks. When legislative
revision occurs, state citizens are less likely to view it as motivated from legislative commitments to property stability or
balancing property interests and state needs. Rather, citizens
may perceive state legislatures acting as the federal court’s
lackey or in a desperate rush to avoid temporary takings damages. One might respond that what matters both substantively
and expressively to citizens is the fact of the reversal, or that
citizens may not understand the federal role in the legislative
226. The costliness of legislative action mitigates against a high frequency
of legislative revision in general. With temporary takings liability under First
English, however, the legislature must weigh the costs of takings liability,
both direct and political, against the costs of legislative revision.
227. See supra Part II.B.4.
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reversal. The latter is possible but not universal, especially in
light of the extensive media coverage that accompanies controversial court decisions on property rights. The former may (or
may not) be true with respect to the particular “judicial taking,”
but it will not generalize to other contexts in which state legislatures and state courts adjust and administer property rights.
A federal judicial takings decision does little to address citizen
confidence in state legislative judgment in the many situations
where takings claims, legislative or judicial, would not apply or
succeed.
B. COSTS TO PROPERTY LAW DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL
ACCOMMODATION
In the face of a federal judicial taking determination, state
legislatures are less likely to innovate, enact comprehensive
legislation, or respond to state court activism with intermediate
or compromise solutions. If the legislature wishes to craft its
own legislation adjusting the adjudicated property rights, even
in minor ways, following a federal court judgment of a judicial
taking, it will reasonably fear that the judicial takings case has
set the stage for subsequent Fifth Amendment takings liability
against the legislature. Accordingly, state legislatures have diminished incentives to engage in lawmaking beyond a straightforward acquiescence in the federal invalidation of the state
court decision. This will tend to chill the legislative development of state property law, including middle ground solutions
and attempts by the legislature to address resource conflicts by
enacting comprehensive regulatory approaches. Of course, the
desirability of intermediate solutions and political accommodation depends on the particular facts and circumstances—the
middle ground is not intrinsically efficient or principled. In
many cases, however, intermediate solutions in property and
water law conflicts are efficient as well as more politically palatable in the long-term than binary conflict resolution. As discussed previously, intermediate solutions may also be faithful
to the common law by reflecting the underlying goals and intentions of common law rules or the common law history of the
228
issue taken as a whole.
Following a judicial taking determination, legislatures
have reduced incentives to engage in a full political process and
allow state interests to be heard. They are likely to invalidate
228. See supra Part II.B.1.
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and either decision, compensate or invalidate, must be accomplished quickly if temporary takings liability is accruing. This
has costs to public acceptance and the legitimacy of state property law. Political process increases the flow of information between interest groups and legislatures and, if sufficiently respectful and fair, can be a surprisingly important factor in
229
citizens’ satisfaction with outcomes. If legislative process does
occur following a federal judicial taking determination, or the
prospect of one, the niceties of “framing” the political process
and the ensuing legislation to emphasize mutual benefits or
public values may be lost—the legislature may feel the federal
230
court order speaks for itself. These dynamics exist with and
without First English liability, but are more intense when the
legislature is acting quickly to minimize temporary takings
damages.
The recent experience in Oregon is instructive. In 2005,
Oregon enacted Measure 37, which required local governments
to either compensate landowners for land use regulations that
231
reduce property values or to repeal those regulations. Nearly
without exception, localities chose to repeal the regulations rather than pay compensation. Measure 37 chilled local government lawmaking, including regulations and potential amendments of contested ordinances, which would have provided net
benefits. A number of local government measures that protected property and increased property values on net foundered because localities were averse or unable to pay compensation to
the subset of negatively impacted property owners, including in
232
some cases minimally harmed owners. These problems led
the Oregon legislature to enact a subsequent law, Measure 49,
which greatly limited the property protection and compensation
233
provisions of Measure 37. Admittedly, the analogy to judicial
takings is imprecise because the decision to invalidate regulations or pay compensation in Measure 37 was vested in local
229. For an account of how procedural fairness in legal processes affects
satisfaction with outcomes and perceptions of laws’ legitimacy, see E. ALLAN
LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 76–
83 (1988).
230. If framing or political accommodation does occur it may appear less
credible against the backdrop of a federal court decision and the legislature’s
unwillingness or inability to pay compensation.
231. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 195.305 (West 2013).
232. See Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from the Oregon Experiment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1329–30 (2009).
233. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 195.300–.336.
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governments. However, there is little reason to believe that following a federal judicial taking determination state governments will be dramatically more likely to open their coffers to
pay compensation or any less risk averse about crafting subsequent middle ground solutions or compromise legislation. In
the judicial takings context, some may view such legislative
chilling as unproblematic on the theory that invalidation and
full restoration of the contested common law right is the only
correct course of action. However, this view does not account for
cases where the common law is opaque or anachronistic or for
the possibility of a superior legislative resolution.
C. CROWDING OUT STATE LEGISLATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMITMENTS
Situating judicial takings oversight in state legislatures
may be one important aspect of developing legislators’ property
constitutionalism. Judicial takings may crowd out to a degree
state legislators’ role in property protection and willingness to
redress state court activism, at least with respect to independ234
ent legislative checks (i.e., not under a federal court order).
Currently, state legislatures perceive themselves as the bodies
responsible for redressing state court radicalism with respect to
property rights, at least if no state court constitutional pronouncement is at play, or the state constitution does not re235
strict constitutional review to courts. For example, the legislative history of the Conatser case makes evident that one of
the aims of the Utah legislature was to enforce state constitu236
tional protection of private property rights. The difficulty of
prevailing on federal due process claims supports this legislative perception.
234. See Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J.
ECON. SURVS. 589, 589–97 (2001) (describing how external punishments and
incentives can reduce intrinsic motivation).
235. For example, the legislature following Conatser discussed that a state
constitutional conclusion from the state supreme court acted as an absolute
restraint on legislative action. The legislator who introduced a bill seeking to
restore the private owners’ rights remarked in the house floor debate that the
“good news is the court did not rely upon any constitutional provisions. There’s
no constitutional analysis; it relied on a statute. The legislature can deal with
statutes; it can clarify and amend.” See Audio recording: Floor Debate on
House Bill 141: Recreational Use of Public Water on Private Property, 2010
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2010) (Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://le.utah.gov/~2010/
htmdoc/hbillhtm/HB0141.htm (statement of Rep. McIff).
236. See Williamson, supra note 138, at 327–28.
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In his theory of judicial overhang, Mark Tushnet contends
that the federal courts’ role reduces the incentives for Congress
to consider constitutional concerns as part of the legislative
237
function. Judicial overhang from a federal judicial takings
doctrine may similarly lessen state legislators’ view of their obligations as constitutional property rights protectors and signal
to legislatures that checks of state court property activism are
not within their properly understood sphere. This is particularly likely because judicial takings doctrine derives from the
Fifth Amendment, which empowers government—apparently
238
now including state courts—to take property. This reinforces
to legislatures the notion that state court property abuses are
now within the judicial sphere, seemingly as an affirmative
state court right as well as a ground for federal court invalidation. If the takings power is equally vested in state courts and
state legislatures, then why should state legislatures check
state courts?
One may question whether it matters if legislators experience crowding out if judicial takings doctrine is available to address state court “takings.” Notably, if the Supreme Court has
exclusive jurisdiction to hear judicial takings cases (a point not
clarified in Stop the Beach with respect to whether third-party
239
claims can originate in federal court), the forum for judicial
takings is limited. Destabilizing the legislative understanding
of its constitutional obligations, even to a modest degree, may
result in less redress for state court property activism. Also,
this view looks too narrowly to state court activity that would
fall within the auspices of a judicial takings doctrine. It neglects the many other property rights issues, in the state courts
and state legislatures, for which a general legislative commitment to avoiding radical, uncompensated redistribution of
property rights is important.
Of course, crowding out, like the other dynamics discussed
in this Part, depends on political pressures and circumstances,
the likelihood of federal forums in addition to Supreme Court
review, and the details of judicial takings doctrine and the fed237. See TUSHNET, supra note 20, at 57–58.
238. For discussion of this point in Stop the Beach, see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2616 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
239. See id. at 2609 (discussing respondents’ arguments over whether federal courts have the capacity to address these claims without deciding if they
have that power).

2013]

JUDICIAL TAKINGS

2231

eral order to the state legislature. For example, one objection to
my account is that if, as the Stop the Beach plurality suggests,
federal courts must return judicial takings judgments to the
state legislatures to acquiesce in the judgment or pay compensation, this may “crowd in” a property-protective role. I think
this is unlikely and if it does so, it will be in the limited sense of
the state legislature viewing its constitutional role as implementing federal court judgments. In a similar vein, if First
English applies, legislatures will perceive if not a constitutional, at least a practical, obligation to act. However, the dynamic
has changed in important ways from the legislature initiating
change on its own volition to it scurrying to avoid racking up
monetary liability.
D. PROCESS CONFLICTS AND MOOTNESS
Of course, judicial takings doctrine does not chill legislative
revision in every circumstance. In the face of overwhelming political pressures or steep social or economic losses, the legislature often has no choice but to act. In Krummenacher v. City of
240
Minnetonka, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the decades-old “reasonable manner” rule, a common law interpretation of an underspecified statutory provision, and held that
granting a variance required a showing that the property in
241
question could not be put to any reasonable use. For a period
of time, this holding effectively wiped out variances as a flexibility device for zoning across the state (though Minnetonka
evaded the ruling by granting a retroactive expansion permit
242
rather than a variance for a non-conforming building project).
Responding to enormous political pressure from a broad-based
constituency of private and public interest groups, spearheaded
240. 783 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. 2010).
241. In this case, Beat Krummenacher sued the city after it granted his
neighbor JoAnne Liebeler, former host of the PBS-TV remodeling show
Hometime, a permit to remodel her roof in order to build a personal yoga studio and craft room. Id. at 724. Consistent with the bi-directional interaction
between courts and legislatures, the Krummenacher court intimated that the
legislature should reconsider the statute when it observed that the court’s
hands were tied “unless and until the legislature takes action to provide a
more flexible variance standard for municipalities.” Id. at 732.
242. See Katelynn Metz, Minnetonka Zoning Fight Has Statewide Impact,
MINNETONKA PATCH, Nov. 17, 2010, http://www.minnetonka.patch.com/
articles/zoning-fight-hits-home-in-minnetonka (interviewing owner of a construction company who could not receive the necessary permits for his clients
following the decision).

2232

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:2176

243

by the League of Minnesota Cities, the legislature swiftly enacted a revision that reinstituted the “reasonable manner”
244
standard with minor modifications. It is not clear whether
the Krummenacher case would qualify as a judicial taking or a
mere restriction on land use (i.e., consonant with regulatory
takings doctrine). However, the point of this case is not the taking per se. Rather, the case illustrates how exigent circumstances or fierce political pressure in response to a state supreme court property decision can provoke a rapid legislative
response that may overlap and duplicate a federal judicial taking appeal.
In the face of intense political pressure or large economic
losses from a state supreme court decision, state legislatures
will act quickly. This creates a risk that the legislative process
will operate concurrently with a judicial takings appeal, wasting institutional resources on duplicative efforts. The legislature may be considering bills, for example, while the federal
court is reviewing the constitutional claim. Of course, political
exigency and the litigants’ awareness of brewing legislative action may in some cases encourage litigants to hold off on federal appeal. In other cases, for a number of reasons, including
strategic litigation decisions, uncertainty about the content of
any state legislative revision, or even to strengthen their position in lobbying the legislature, litigants may file judicial takings appeals despite the likelihood of a legislative response.

243. See Katelynn Metz, Fight Between Minnetonka Neighbors Finds Fix at
State Capitol, MINNETONKA PATCH, April 28, 2011, http://minnetonka.patch
.com/articles/fight-between-minnetonka-neighors-finds-fix-at-state-capitol.
The long list of interest groups in support of the revision included the League
of Minnesota Cities, the Association of Minnesota Counties, the Association of
Minnesota Building Officials, Metro Cities, the Minnesota Shopping Association, the St. Paul Chamber of Commerce, and many other public associations.
State builders, realtors, and agricultural interests supported revision of
Krummenacher on the condition that the revised law not give local government the authority to impose conditions on the grant of a variance. See Variance Bill Alert and Update, METRO CITIES (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www
.metrocitiesmn.org/index.asp?Type=B_BASIC&SEC=%7BCB72E760-F9D0
-4BE4-83C2-BC7C0D3B0B5A%7D (describing interest groups debating the
proposed bills).
244. Applicants must show that they propose “to use the property in a reasonable manner not permitted by the zoning ordinance.” The legislature
changed the standard for granting a variance to “practical difficulties” and retained the former prongs of the test requiring that unique circumstances of
the property necessitate the variance and that the variance will not alter the
essential character of the locality. MINN. STAT. § 462.357 subdiv. 6(2) (2011).
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In addition to wasting resources in duplicative processes,
temporal overlap between federal court review and state legislative revision may also stymie the judicial appeal process with
prudential concerns. If First English does not apply and a legislative revision passes while the federal appeal is pending, it
could moot the judicial takings claim, at least if invalidation is
the remedy for judicial takings. If First English applies, the
claim will not be mooted in its entirety, as the temporary damages remain. However, it is conceivable that state legislatures
could attempt to dismantle First English takings liability, as
they have done in some cases with legislative takings by localities, by enacting laws that make judicial takings void ab initio
because the taker, here the state court, acted without authori245
ty. This would be vulnerable on federal and state grounds,
but it is conceivable that such legislation would survive on the
basis claimed by the Stop the Beach plurality: there is no federal constitutional distinction between state courts and legisla246
tures.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR JUDICIAL TAKINGS DOCTRINE
If judicial takings is a matter of constitutional necessity to
protect property, as the Stop the Beach plurality claims, then
why has it not developed in federal or state constitutional law?
The framers did not envision judicial takings as a matter of
original intent and there is no indication that it was part of the
original understanding of the federal Takings Clause at the
247
time of Constitution-making. In over two hundred years, the
245. I thank Stewart Sterk for this insightful point. See E-mail from Stewart Sterk, Professor of Law, Cardozo Sch. of Law, to author (Oct. 1, 2012, 9:15
EST) (on file with author).
246. See id.
247. Indeed, it appears that the framers contemplated only physical takings, not regulatory takings much less judicial ones. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1028 n.15 (1992); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *135 (eminent domain was a legislative, not judicial power).
For an insightful historical account of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause,
see generally William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE
L.J. 694, 700–17 (1985). Stacey Dogan and Ernest Young write that, “From a
historical perspective, it strikes us as odd to suddenly define as a taking the
kind of common-law evolution that was occurring before, during, and after the
adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but was never thought to
raise Takings Clause concerns.” Dogan & Young, supra note 4, at 114. For a
discussion of how original meaning differs from originalism, see Keith E.
Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 601–05
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Supreme Court has not adopted a judicial takings doctrine or
even discussed in detail in a majority opinion the application of
the Takings Clause to the judiciary. The closest the Court has
come is dicta in Justice Stewart’s concurrence in Hughes v.
Washington, in which he noted that while the state court decision at issue conformed to reasonable expectations, if the facts
were otherwise “a State cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due
process of law by the simple device of asserting retroactively
248
that the property it has taken never existed at all.” Webb’s
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckworth, another case cited by
the Stop the Beach plurality, did not directly address a judicial
decision but rather whether a county clerk lawfully refused to
return nearly $100,000 in interest on purchase price money deposited into a bankruptcy receivership account because the
statute, as interpreted by the court, deemed the interest “public
249
money.” At the state level, no state or state court has adopted
a judicial takings doctrine. This does not appear to stem from
state laxity toward property protection. Many states have imposed substantive limits and procedural hurdles that constrain
regulatory takings more stringently than the federal constitu250
tional floor of protection.
This Article contends that the protective function of state
legislatures and the advantages of state legislative checks offer
a partial answer to why judicial takings doctrine has not developed to date. State institutions have evolved legislative checks,
as well as common law doctrines and political restraints, as
functional substitutes for judicial takings. The judicial takings
debate has taken a myopic view, looking at institutional and
doctrinal mechanisms in isolation and focusing narrowly on
courts. Viewing only one moving piece biases toward the per(2004).
248. 389 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
249. 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980). The Supreme Court also attempted to situate judicial takings in constitutional history with Pruneyard Shopping Center
v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80–84 (1980), however, by the Court’s own admission
that “opinion addressed only the claimed taking by the constitutional provision” and “not the ‘judicial reconstruction of a State’s laws of private property.’” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S.
Ct. 2592, 2602 (2010).
250. See generally HARVEY M. JACOBS, STATE PROPERTY RIGHTS LAWS: THE
IMPACTS OF THOSE LAWS ON MY LAND (1999) (reviewing state laws that provide enhanced substantive or procedural protection against regulatory takings).
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ception that unchecked state court property rights abuse is a
problem of greater magnitude than it is in reality. Working in
concert, state legislative revision, judicial norms, and popular
pressures inhibit and address judicial takings; where these
checks fail in some cases due process claims have successfully
restored private rights. Due process, with its high threshold for
a claimant to prevail and nebulous doctrinal parameters,
makes success, particularly on substantive due process claims,
251
difficult and uncertain. Although criticized by the Stop the
Beach plurality on these bases, these qualities also roughly tailor due process to the most extreme and exceptional cases of
state court abuse and encourage other avenues of redress, in252
cluding state political process.
The functionality of state legislative checks of courts is especially important in light of the high costs of a constitutional
judicial takings doctrine. A growing collection of scholarship
describes the potential costs of judicial takings doctrine to the
development of the common law, judicial resources, federalism,
environmental protection and climate change adaptation, and
the internal consistency of Fifth Amendment takings jurispru253
dence. Most damagingly, a constitutional doctrine that re251. In addition, due process has benefited from several decades of Supreme Court review and federal-state accommodation that has lessened its effects on state autonomy. Indeed, the history of due process is instructive on
the risk of creating new constitutional rights with no thought to the effects on
the state legislative function. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 passim (1905). In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 382–85 (1937), and
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963), the Court held that the fundamental rights theory infringed on the authority of state legislatures. Subsequent cases have refined these holdings and charted a workable, if at times
tense, balance between state autonomy and federal due process review.
252. See, e.g., Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460 F. Supp. 473, 478 (D.
Haw. 1978).
253. See Christie, supra note 16, at 73 (criticizing freezing common law development via judicial takings doctrine at a time when the law requires flexibility to respond to climate change and rising sea levels); cf. Craig Anthony
Arnold, Legal Castles in the Sand: The Evolution of Property Law, Culture,
and Ecology in Coastal Lands, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV. 213, 257–58 (2011) (suggesting that judicial takings constraints should apply when judges eliminate
property rights in static, unchanging or degraded land but not when the ecology or geomorphology of coastal lands is changing or has changed); Dogan &
Young, supra note 4, at 115–16 (discussing costs to common law development
and federalism); Kent, Jr., supra note 16, at 157–61 (identifying unresolved
questions about the doctrinal impact and interaction of regulatory takings
with the Lingle precedent and judicial takings); Mulvaney, supra note 4, at
266 (discussing harms to common law evolution); Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 313 (addressing destabilized property doctrines).
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stricts the elimination of a common law property right, no matter how out of sync that right may be with the current legal
framework, limits the capacity of courts to respond to changed
circumstances and arrests the development of the common
254
law. This is problematic in many contexts, including the environmental issues raised in Stop the Beach where the state
was responding to beach erosion likely caused or exacerbated
255
by climate change. In addition to impeding common law evolution, judicial takings doctrine may also distort legislative
property law development, as discussed in Part III.
There are also burdens to judicial administration from expanding the Fifth Amendment’s purview. The availability of a
judicial takings claim enables owners with financial resources
to strategically threaten litigation and appeal on judicial tak256
ings grounds against less cash-flush opponents. Depending
on its scope and standards, judicial takings doctrine may strain
court dockets, as recognized by Justice Breyer who noted that
“many thousands of cases involving state property law” could
be subject to judicial takings claims under the Stop the Beach
257
plurality’s approach. As my discussion of the Robinson v.
Ariyoshi case illustrates, there is also potential for complicated
procedural and prudential issues to protract litigation and judi258
cial takings appeals across many years. The magnitude of
254. See Dogan & Young, supra note 4, at 108 (discussing judicial takings
as an impediment to common law evolution and a threat to the autonomy of
state courts to interpret state law property doctrines); cf. A. Dan Tarlock, Water Law’s Climate Disruption Adaptation Potential, N.W. L. SEARLE CENTER 7
n.28 (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/programs/
searlecenter/workingpapers/documents/Tarlock_Water.pdf.
255. See Christie, supra note 16, at 73 (discussing the environmental consequences of freezing common law development via judicial takings doctrine at
a time when the law requires flexibility to respond to climate change and rising sea levels); cf. Arnold, supra note 253, at 257–58 (suggesting that judicial
takings constraints should apply when judges eliminate property rights in
static, unchanging or degraded land but not when the ecology or geomorphology of coastal lands is changing or has changed).
256. Eduardo Peñalver & Lior Strahilevitz make the claim that judicial
takings doctrine disincentivizes investment in litigation to clarify property law
rights at trial by providing a constitutional avenue of appeal for a decision
against the plaintiff. See Peñalver & Strahilevitz, supra note 16, at 313.
257. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130
S. Ct. 2592, 2619 (2010) (Breyer, J., concurring); cf. Barros, supra note 4, at
959 (arguing that if “the scope of the Just Compensation Clause is properly
limited to government actions that result in public-private transfers, this prudential concern largely disappears”).
258. See supra Part II.C.
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these costs depends on how expansively the Court defines the
standard for judicial takings.
Doctrinally, there are costs to specification of the issues left
opaque in the Stop the Beach plurality opinion, such as the interaction between judicial takings and the framework for regulatory takings delineated by the Court in Lingle v. Chevron and
whether the public use requirement applies or judicial takings
259
encompass private party cases. In particular, remedy and the
scope of damages liability raise thorny issues. Because the text
of the Takings Clause explicitly requires “just compensation” it
is likely that if the Court adopts judicial takings it will be with
260
a compensation remedy rather than invalidation.
As the
branch with spending power, presumably state legislatures
would need to be involved in the compensation decision, either
by approving compensation in individual cases or by providing
a pre-determined compensation fund; otherwise, courts could
261
order virtually unlimited compensation. This is a problematic
form of a legislative check that may raise separation of powers
issues, depending on individual state constitutional law, as well
as claims that the legislature is violating the newfound takings
power of the state courts. First English liability for temporary
takings is another hurdle for judicial takings doctrine. If First
English does not apply, it is likely to reinforce legislative inertia in the face of judicial overreaching as well as sever judicial
262
takings from regulatory takings jurisprudence. If it does apply, financial liability may spur state legislatures to check the
courts too frequently or too severely, mute intermediate solutions, and truncate aspects of the political process important to
public acceptance and the perceived legitimacy of legal transi263
tions.
259. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005). For a discussion of the tension between regulatory takings and judicial takings and the
potential impacts of Stop the Beach on future regulatory takings cases, see
Kent, Jr., supra note 16, at 157–61. Judicial takings may exacerbate the
“muddle” of federal takings law as described by Carol Rose. See Carol M. Rose,
Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 561, 561–62 (1984).
260. See Stop the Beach, 130 S.Ct. at 2617 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
261. If legislatures did not have the right to approve compensation in some
form, then they might have incentives to subvert the state courts by engaging
in strategic non-enforcement aimed at causing the takings claim to fail on
mootness or ripeness grounds.
262. See supra Part III.A.
263. See supra Part III.A–B.
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This Article argues that state legislative process, coupled
with other institutional restraints, provides substantial protection against judicial property activism. In this Part, I examine
how takings federalism grounds and strengthens the case for
the status quo of state political process protection. I address objections to my account, such as why institutional and political
checks justify treating state courts differently than legislatures. I also offer some initial thoughts on whether the subset
of cases involving out-of-state property interests necessitate
constitutional judicial takings protection.
A. THE TAKINGS FEDERALISM CONUNDRUM: WHY WE SHOULD
TREAT STATE COURTS DIFFERENTLY
Judicial takings create a dilemma: the Supreme Court
must either embroil itself in state property law and local land
use conflicts or devolve the development and oversight of judicial takings to the allegedly offending state courts. In the regulatory takings context, the closest analog to judicial takings,
federal courts have found they are ill-equipped to address state
property law issues and have de facto delegated primary responsibility for regulatory takings law development and admin264
istration to the state courts. This history of takings federalism puts into starker relief the problems with judicial takings
doctrine—and the rationales for relying on existing political
and institutional constraints on state courts.
The Supreme Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence
makes clear that states, and state courts, define property. Regulatory takings doctrine relies on “background principles” of
265
state law nuisance to determine takings claims. Property law
varies significantly across the states based on differences in
politics, natural resources, culture, fiscal conditions, and statespecific historical understandings of public versus private
266
rights. Not only does state law create the baseline of property
rights, it is also necessary to determine the degree of change
from the baseline that is acceptable (this is represented in regulatory takings with the standard of “distinct investment267
backed expectations”). As Stewart Sterk explains, “[t]he Tak264. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 205–08.
265. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
266. Cf. Sterk, supra note 29, at 223 (discussing differences in states’ definitions of property rights).
267. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
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ings Clause protects primarily against change in background
268
state law.” Changes in property law may be takings in one
state with a high and stable baseline of property protection but
not in another state whose courts and legislature have historically protected public interests at the expense of development
269
or ownership rights.
Sterk’s account of regulatory takings describes how the
Supreme Court defers to state courts, most potently by making
the test for a regulatory taking so weak that state courts have
270
de facto control over doctrine and case resolution.
State
courts and legislatures must provide specification and stronger
271
standards, if desired. In addition, precedents such as San
Remo and Williamson County impose exhaustion and other requirements that channel takings cases to state courts and force
state courts to develop and administer takings law, either as a
state constitutional matter or, as is often the case, under co272
terminous state and federal takings doctrines. The Supreme
Court has a strong incentive to delegate to the states, as Sterk
observes, because regulatory takings decisions which depend on
state law afford limited opportunities to provide national uniformity or guidance (important institutional goals of Supreme
273
Court review). In contrast, in its physical takings jurisprudence the Supreme Court has been able to articulate a national
standard, a permanent physical occupation of land, that applies
across the states. Accordingly, the Court has been more active
274
in the area of physical takings.
(1978).
268. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 206.
269. See id. at 222; see also Bloom & Serkin, supra note 17, at 573–74.
270. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 230–31.
271. See id. at 231–32.
272. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 327 (2005);
Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 186–97 (1985); Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings
Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251, 253–55 (2006) (ripeness requirements
for federal review of takings cases is an “essential pillar” of the Court’s
longstanding though unarticulated delegation of takings conflicts to the state
courts).
273. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 228. Sterk notes that in discrete areas of
regulatory takings where the Court can create nationally uniform rules it has
done so, including the Lucas rule requiring compensation for regulations that
deprive an owner of 100% of her property value and the Nolan-Dolan rule requiring a causal nexus between a development’s impact and a municipal exaction. See id. at 207.
274. See id. at 232.
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In the judicial takings context, federal courts will need to
review state court determinations about the scope and content
of state-created property rights and untangle complicated histories of public and private rights. Like regulatory takings,
many judicial takings claims will address state court decisions
on local land use regulation, involving local circumstances and
municipal law and procedure. If judicial takings doctrine tracks
regulatory takings even loosely, federal courts will need to determine the substantive state law to resolve whether the state
court “took” a common law property right and whether the degree of change violates the Takings Clause. The regulatory takings standard for investment-backed expectations is likely to
apply in some form and require federal courts to determine the
permissible degree of property change from the prior baseline
of the state’s law and history of private property protection.
Some scholars have also observed a property rights “trap” for
judicial takings: if state laws define property, as the Supreme
Court has long recognized, how can state courts as the authoritative interpreters of state law “err” so as to give rise to a judi275
cial taking?
Because judicial takings entail state law determinations of
property rights, the Supreme Court will find itself mired in the
very review of state property law that it has spent decades attempting to extricate itself from in its regulatory takings jurisprudence. True substantive protection against judicial takings
(i.e., at least a moderately robust standard) will require several
layers of Supreme Court effort. The Court must develop standards and resolve the doctrinal holes described previously, such
as remedy and temporary takings liability. Then, the Court will
need to create iterations and applications of judicial takings to
individual state cases, each with its own state property law,
background common law of nuisance, and reasonable expectations of property protection. This will require the Supreme
276
Court to labor well outside its institutional expertise. Further, these opinions will not provide national (or even circuit-

275. Frederic Bloom and Christopher Serkin explain this view: “Judicial
takings thus cannot be seen as a means of error correction, since authoritative
state courts cannot be wrong about the content of their own law.” Bloom &
Serkin, supra note 17, at 572 (arguing that judicial takings is a tool of legal
transition relief, not error correction).
276. See Dogan & Young, supra note 4, at 115–17.
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wide, in the case of appellate federal court review) uniformity
277
or guidance.
Alternatively, as with regulatory takings, the Supreme
Court can (and is likely to) delegate de facto much of judicial
takings doctrine development to the state courts through narrow federal protection and a high threshold for claimant success. If the Supreme Court follows this path, the federal standard for a judicial taking will likely be at a level of generality
that offers limited guidance, substantive clarity, or conceptual
traction (vagueness and generality enable a standard to apply
across disparate state property law frameworks). Indeed, the
Supreme Court, faced with the challenges of articulating a national constitutional standard for judicial takings amid the diversity of state property law, might develop the judicial takings
doctrine so that it has virtually no impact—an outcome that
raises the question of why we should adopt judicial takings at
278
all. Delimiting judicial takings doctrine with a toothless federal standard or obstacles to the federal forum under the belief
that state courts will develop and enforce substantive judicial
takings law to restrain their own decisions threatens a constitutionally empty doctrine.
To be clear, the problem is not that state courts are globally unwilling to limit themselves—they already do so through
state due process and the other common law doctrines dis279
cussed in Part I. What is unlikely is that state supreme
courts will perceive the need to disrupt their present system of
restraints to interpret cases so as to create a vigorous judicial
takings doctrine absent a strong federal floor of protection (particularly since the doctrine state supreme courts develop will
apply against them as well as lower state courts). It is also
questionable whether state legislatures have an incentive to
wade into the political and doctrinal quagmire to develop statutory judicial takings prohibitions, especially given their capacity for legislative override and judicial jurisdiction-stripping.
In summary, there does not seem to be a viable way for the
Supreme Court to develop judicial takings doctrine except to
follow the path it has chosen for regulatory takings and to implicitly delegate much of judicial takings development and in277. See Sterk, supra note 29, at 230–31.
278. Cf. Fennell, supra note 14, at 90 (describing a very narrow scope and
impact of judicial takings).
279. See supra Part I.A.
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terpretation to the state courts. Such delegation works for legislative takings in part because of institutional separation: legislative decisions are reviewed by the separate institution of
the state court. For judicial takings, however, this creates a
dubious situation of institutional self-policing with state courts
de facto developing the federal constitutional doctrine meant to
280
constrain them. These issues offer a rejoinder to the plurality’s assertion that the Fifth Amendment does not differentiate
281
among state actors. The Fifth Amendment should be interpreted in view of its institutional and doctrinal ramifications.
The infeasibility of the Supreme Court developing doctrine for
state law-based judicial takings questions and state lawdefined property on the one hand and the problems of implicit
delegation of judicial takings doctrine to the states and state
court self-policing on the other, are reasons why the Fifth
Amendment does, and should, discriminate among state ac282
tors.
B. OUT-OF-STATE INTERESTS
The strongest case for a federal judicial takings doctrine is
to address interstate “spillovers” where a state court decision
wrongfully contracts out-of-state, federal, or tribal property
rights. William Fischel has discussed this problem of legal
280. The difficulties of judicial takings federalism address a seeming discrepancy in my account: even though state legislatures are subject to “checks”
from state courts in the form of judicial review and are of course politically responsive bodies, state legislatures are still subject to federal takings liability.
For judicial takings review, the problems of state court self-policing and the
interference with takings federalism suggest a strong reason for treating state
courts differently than state legislatures for Fifth Amendment purposes.
281. Justice Scalia wrote, “There is no textual justification for saying that
the existence or the scope of a State’s power to expropriate private property
without just compensation varies according to the branch of government effecting the expropriation.” Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010).
282. In addition, the Takings Clause does not contain the term “state”—if,
as a textual matter, the failure to specify a branch of government means that
the Takings Clause applies to all branches, then should the omission of the
term “state” extend the Takings Clause to private actors? For an intriguing
theory of private takings, see Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 517, 560–71 (2009). Bell also observes that the Fifth Amendment never
explicitly granted the takings power exclusively to the states, although the
fact that at the time of its adoption the Fifth Amendment applied only to the
national government indicates that it was an enumerated power. See id. at
525. For a discussion of the limits of textualism, see generally Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 (2009).
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spillovers in the context of regulatory takings and property
283
rights protection. When such a case is in state court, there
may be a stronger rationale for enhanced constitutional protection of out-of-state interests. In theory, there is a greater risk
for judicial redistribution to favor in-state interests (notably in
a recent case a state court justice lost a retention election fol284
lowing her opinion validating federal water rights). And of
course there is no incentive, and indeed a strong disincentive,
for the legislature to intervene and check the state court decision.
Given the lack of data and comprehensive examination of
this issue in property rights cases, at this juncture I am reluctant to recommend extending judicial takings narrowly to cases
addressing out-of-state interests. Resolving this question requires an in-depth inquiry, partially empirical, that is not presently available. It is not clear that judicial favoritism toward
in-state interests occurs with enough frequency, or in the absence of adequate legal protection from other doctrines, to justify the costs of even a narrowly cabined judicial takings doctrine—or that a judicial takings doctrine is the best legal
prophylactic. Diversity and federal question jurisdiction mean
that such cases often, though not inevitably, are heard in federal court. Importantly, there are an array of other laws,
norms, and rules, including conflict of laws doctrines, which
protect against unfair treatment of out-of-state interests. For
example, in water law cases (a common setting for significant
shifts in common law property rights), interstate compacts, the
common law of equitable apportionment, and the dormant
commerce clause either constrain judges directly or supply
285
norms against disadvantaging out-of-state interests. In sum,
the legal system has developed doctrines and norms to address
out-of-state property interests that counsel caution in innovating additional Fifth Amendment protection.

283. See FISCHEL, supra note 2, at 326–27.
284. See In re SRBA, No. 24546, 1999 WL 778325 (Idaho Oct. 1, 1999), superseded on reh’g, Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1270 (Idaho
2000) (Justice Silak’s controversial opinion); Echeverria, supra note 27, at
238–54.
285. I thank Dan Tarlock for his helpful points on this topic and on the
Conatser case as well.
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CONCLUSION
In Stop the Beach, a Supreme Court plurality opinion
launched judicial takings in political and scholarly debate and
laid the groundwork for future elaboration of a judicial takings
doctrine. This Article has explored a neglected institution in
this debate—state legislatures. State political process protection calls into question the need to innovate a Fifth Amendment judicial takings doctrine and offers a compelling defense
of the status quo. Case studies reveal unique institutional
strengths to legislative checks of courts and suggest that legislative process provides substantial protection against judicial
overreaching. Moreover, state legislative process accomplishes
this without the costs to property law development and federalism of a constitutional judicial takings doctrine.

